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“I am tormented by an everlasting itch for things remote. I love to sail
forbidden seas, and land on barbarous coasts.”1
INTRODUCTION
Fittingly enough, their history begins in the same decade, their creation
borne forward by the same ideological currents and overseen by similarly
conversant intellects.2 In 1940, William A. Schnader,3 with the concurrence of
a more collectively4 and poetically inclined Karl N. Llewellyn,5 proposed the
creation of a complete commercial code for adoption by every state.6 Destined
to become its era’s “most ambitious codification” after years of effort “by
literally hundreds of . . . lawyers and businessmen,”7 Schnader’s project aimed
not just to achieve the coordination of the Uniform Sales Act, the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law, the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, Uniform
Warehouse Receipts Act, and all other such acts in the field of commercial law,8

1
HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK: OR, THE WHALE 8 (Modern Library 1892) (1851). As Plutarch once
observed, “geographers . . . crowd into the edges of their maps parts of the world which they do not know about,
adding notes in the margin to the effect, that beyond this lies nothing but sandy deserts full of wild beasts,
unapproachable bogs, Scythian ice, or a frozen sea . . . .” PLUTARCH, Theseus, in 2 PLUTARCH’S LIVES OF
ILLUSTRIOUS MEN 1 (1880).
2
See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Curious Case of Transborder Sales Law: A Comparative Analysis of CESl,
CISG, and the UCC, in CISG VS. REGIONAL SALES LAW UNIFICATION: WITH A FOCUS ON THE NEW COMMON
EUROPEAN SALES LAW 28–29 (Ulrich Magnus ed., Sellier European Law Publishers 2007).
3
At the time, Schnader served as president of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, an organization which agitated for and drafted uniform laws on commercial subjects in 1896, 1906,
1909, 1918, and 1933. Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn’s Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541 n.1, 545–46 (2006).
4
Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code 1949–54, 49 BUFF. L.
REV. 359, 392 (2001).
5
Id. at 277; cf. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 11 (Steven
Sheppard ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (1930) (“The lawyer’s slip in etiquette is the client’s ruin. From this
angle I say procedural regulations are the door, and the only door, to make real what is laid down by substantive
law. Procedural regulations enter into and condition all substantive law’s becoming actual when there is a
dispute.”).
6
Maggs, supra note 3, at 541 n.1, 546; see also, e.g., William A. Schnader, A Short History of the
Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 1 (1967) (setting forth
his role); Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798,
799–800 (1958) (retelling this same history).
7
Soia Mentschikoff, Highlights of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 MOD. L. REV. 167, 167 (1964).
Soia Mentschikoff had married Llewellyn in 1946 and served as his assistant reporter. Braucher, supra note 6,
at 800; Kamp, supra note 4, at 277–78. In 1964, she represented the United States at The Hague to push for the
adoption of an international uniform sales law, thereby playing a role in CISG’s own evolution. See, e.g., E.
Allan Farnsworth, Soia Mentschikoff as Reformer, 16 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1964).
8
By 1940, neither these laws nor their amendments had been enacted by every state. Schnader, supra
note 6, at 2.
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but also their modernization and extension to then-unregulated fields.9 Nearly a
decade later, Llewellyn, Schnader’s chosen reporter,10 and the peerless drafting
crew that he assembled released a draft composed of nine integrated articles,
with notes and comments appended.11 In August 1953, after several minor
amendments were proposed and ratified, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC
or U.C.C.) saw the day’s light.12 Meanwhile, touched by this same desire for
predictability and uniformity in commercial matters,13 Ernst Rabel, a German
Jew destined to flee to the United States,14 crafted the progenitor of the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG or
C.I.S.G.),15 its immediate predecessor—the Uniform Law on the Formation of
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Law on the
International Sale of Goods—adopted in 1964,16 and thereby gained unofficial

9
Walter D. Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code in the United States, 12 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 226,
229 (1963); see also Schnader, supra note 6, at 2 (summarizing these laws’ perceived problems, including
“inconsistencies between the several acts themselves” and the fact “that . . . certain of the provisions of these
acts had become, if not obsolete, at least not suitable to govern the business practices of the day”). Interestingly,
despite its focus on uniformity, the UCC was proposed so as to undercut a movement for a federal sales law.
10
Schnader, supra note 6, at 4.
11
Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn’s Attempt to Achieve The
Good, The True, The Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1141 n.1 (1985). See also Schnader,
supra note 6, at 5.
12
Braucher, supra note 6, at 800–01; see also Schnader, supra note 6, at 6–8 (summarizing the process).
Because the UCC’s adoption proceeded state-by-state, it has no single effective date. However, by 1968, it had
been ratified by every state except Louisiana, though many did so after making a bewildering array of alterations.
See E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Uniformity of Commercial Law and State-by-State Enactment: A Confluence of
Contradictions, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 337, 337 (1978–79). Of course, the UCC’s own ambiguous language did not
help, id., as Llewellyn seemingly once conceded, see Karl N. Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN.
L. REV. 779, 784 (1953) (“I am ashamed of . . . [the Code] in some ways; there are so many pieces that I could
make a little better; there are so many beautiful ideas I tried to get in that would have been good for the law, but
I was voted down.”).
13
Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, The CISG—Successes and Pitfalls, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 457,
459 (2009); see also Edita Ubartaite, Application of the CISG in the United States, 7 EUR. J. L. REFORM 277,
279 (2005).
14
For more on this extraordinary man, see Max Rheinstein, In Memory of Ernst Rabel, 5 AM. J. COMP.
L. 185 (1956).
15
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art. 1(1)(a), Apr. 11, 1980,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter “CISG”]. Throughout this discussion, two administrative
facts should be kept in mind. First, CISG has never been published in an official United States treaty source.
Second, while the treaty itself was adopted on April 11, 1980, and transmitted to the Senate on September 21,
1983, the United States ratified it on December 11, 1986. Within the United States, it became effective on
January 1, 1988. 15 U.S.C. App. at 332 (1998), observed in VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co.,
No. 12 C 8154, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29791, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2013).
16
Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 13, at 459–60. The International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law (“UNIDROIT”) produced other drafts in 1956, 1958, and 1963. Anthony S. Winer, The CISG
Convention and Thomas Franck’s Theory of Legitimacy, 19 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 6 (1998–99). In 1968, the
United Nation Commission on International Trade Law (“UNICTRAL”) was established. Schwenzer &
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designation as this treaty’s grandfather17 and christened himself as its
mastermind.18 As this history suggests, each of these two protocols emerged
from the minds of realists enamored of standardization.19 In time, CISG
(“arguably the most influential uniform law on transborder sales in the world
today”)20 and the UCC (the controlling commercial code in forty-nine states21
and so regnant as to be classified as federal common law by sundry courts22 and
to be implied into countless contracts)23 became part of the fabric of U.S. law,
equally binding within their fixed sphere.24
Enjoying an “uneasy coexistence,” CISG and the UCC converge in some
details even as they diverge in other particulars.25 Philosophically, under either
Hachem, supra note 13, at 460. It was UNICTRAL that produced the draft that became CISG in 1980 Vienna.
Id.
17
See Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception to the Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (1993); see also Michael B. Lopez,
Resurrecting the Public Good: Amending the Validity Exception in the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods for the 21st Century, 10 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 133, 138 (2009–10).
18
Bernard Grossfeld & Peter Winship, The Law Professor Refugee, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COMP. 3,
11 (1992); see also Ulrich Magnus, The Vienna Sales Convention (CISG) Between Civil and Common Law-Best
of All Worlds?, 3 J. CIV. L. 67, 72–73, 73 n.22 (2010) (summarizing Rabel’s role and citing Grossfeld & Winship,
supra note 18, at 11).
19
See Grossfeld & Winship, supra note 18, at 9–13; see also, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and
Context: A Dual Track Theory of Interpretation, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 397, 410–16 (2004–05); Kamp, supra
note 4, at 283, 286. Tantalizingly, from 1931 and 1940, Llewelyn and Rabel exchanged a number of letters
regarding their ongoing projects. Grossfeld & Winship, supra note 18, at 13–17 (detailing the relationship
between Llewellyn and Rabel from 1931 to 1940). Rabel, it seems, initially “believed he had a personal
relationship with Llewellyn and that the latter held him in high esteem” and “expect[ed] the drafters of the
Uniform Commercial Code to receive him with open arms.” Id. at 15. He thus tried to persuade Llewellyn to
coordinate his draft of the UCC with his 1935 draft, and Llewellyn at one point even “speculated that special
rules for international trade may be inserted into the [Uniform Commercial] Code.” Id. at 15, 17. For all its
potential, these giants’ collaboration proved brief, and no more letters were exchanged after January 1940. Id.
at 13, 17.
20
Carla Spivak, Of Shrinking Sweatsuits and Poison Vine Wax: A Comparison of Basis for Excuse Under
U.C.C. § 2-615 and CISG Article 79, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 757, 757 (2006); see also Magnus, supra note
18, at 71 (“[T]he Convention has become the most important legal basis of today’s globalized trade.”).
21
See, e.g., In re Doctors Hosp. of Hyde Park, Inc., 337 F.3d 951, 955 (7th Cir. 2003); A. Brooke Overby,
Modeling UCC Drafting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645, 653 (1995–96); Ellen A. Peters, Remedies for Breach of
Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73
YALE L.J. 199, 199 (1963).
22
See, e.g., Curtin v. United Airlines, Inc., 275 F.3d 88, 93 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2001); O’Neill v. United States,
50 F.3d 677, 684 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Conrad Publ’g Co., 589 F.2d 949, 953 (8th Cir. 1978).
Considering the UCC’s dominance amongst the fifty states, this result follows from the usual axiom that “a
federal court applying federal common law will often simply incorporate the law of the appropriate state if there
is no relevant federal interest to justify a distinct federal rule.” United States v. Fleet Bank (In re Calore Express
Co.), 288 F.3d 22, 52 (1st Cir. 2002).
23
See DiMatteo, supra note 2, at 30.
24
See Winer, supra note 16, at 2.
25
DiMatteo, supra note 2, at 30–31.
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legal regime, the goods portion of a certain contract effectively dominates, and
both codes contain analogous provisions for defining absent terms and afford
decided recognition of party and industry customs and practices. Indeed, some
of the same defects taint both, most especially their failure to account for the
increasing use of computers in domestic and international sales. This frequent
concord follows naturally, as Rabel saw the “English common law tradition”26
from which the UCC grew as “best suited for . . . international unification.”27
In spite of this congruence, however, their divergences are equally manifest.
Focused purely on business interests and contract formation, CISG adopts
subjective standards, requires neither writing (with some exceptions) nor
consideration, and constructs a mottled remedial scheme in which specific
performance is enthroned above all others. The UCC, in turn, places foremost
emphasis on objective criteria, addressing contract formation and validity for
businesses and consumers. Properly applied, CISG may allow for the creation
of a contract that would otherwise not exist under the UCC or assess the value
of a claim rather differently than the UCC would dare try. In other words, CISG
promotes performance even in the presence of a breach—and punishes obdurate
nonperformance accordingly. Regardless of their plethora of similarities, then,
CISG and the UCC are not wholly alike in analytical methodology and practical
effect.
Unfortunately, federal and state courts in the United States have only
imperfectly and haphazardly heeded this basic verity, thereby spawning an
amorphous body of law characterized by more glaring omissions and errata than
nuanced analysis. With impressive consistency, federal and state courts invoke
the UCC as a guide and proceed to utilize its provisions. Eliding distinctions,
though subject to two exceptions, these tribunals either utilize an improper—
and thus interpretively forbidden—methodology or reach a mistaken—and
textually unjustifiable—conclusion regarding a contract’s existence or an
award’s propriety. Even where CISG’s writ is acknowledged, U.S. decisions on
this seminal treaty evidence an erroneous tendency to look first to case law, then
to the statute, on the part of even the most assiduous jurist. In short, domestic
law interpreting CISG remains rather limited in its quantity and haphazard in its

26
Perhaps unsurprisingly, however, Rabel misconstrued the true origins of modern contract law. “The
common law was property-based,” which is why Sir. William Blackstone, its great expositor, devoted little time
to contracts or commercial law. Douglas G. Baird, Llewellyn’s Heirs, 62 LA. L. REV. 1287, 1289 (2002).
“[U]nderstanding that commercial law must be shaped by the world in which it operates and the forces at work
there,” Llewellyn constructed the UCC based on “the Law Merchant” and not English common law. Id. at 1290.
27
Magnus, supra note 18, at 74.
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reasoning, and difficulties thus confront any lawyer seeking to discover and cite
cogent authority on a client’s behalf.
Considering the preeminent role of contracts in the determination of a
debtor’s liabilities in cases filed under the Bankruptcy Code (the Code),28 the
defects so endemic in CISG’s jurisprudence have already arisen within a handful
of bankruptcy courts,29 as too few have noticed.30 In fact, as more global
contracts are forged and as the Code internationalizes, these weaknesses may
proliferate, tainting future liquidations or stymieing coming reorganizations in
which more than purely domestic debts or actors are implicated. With “[t]he
growing body of case law interpreting and using the CISG involv[ing] not only
its direct application to creditors’ rights, but the indirect guidance that the CISG
might offer to provide meaning or context in resolving a range of disputes and
ambiguities in seemingly unrelated American law,”31 the time is nigh for
bankruptcy’s practitioners, scholars, and judges to attain a fundamental
understanding of CISG’s nuances and ambiguities and thereby avoid replicating
the mistakes of their non-bankruptcy predecessors.
In four substantive parts, this Article provides a first scholarly look at
CISG’s intersection with bankruptcy law so as to address the impending crisis.
Part I portrays one common scenario, derived from a recent New York case, in
which CISG and the UCC clashed prior to a debtor’s bankruptcy filing but
without the cognizance of the relevant state court. Setting the stage for this
Article’s synthesis, Part II summarizes several bankruptcy provisions whose
interpretation often requires reference to the UCC and, therefore, CISG, and Part
III précises CISG’s jurisdictional provisions and interpretive scheme. Finally,
Part IV limns the kind of analysis compelled by CISG as to three areas—contract
formation, breach, and damages—directly relevant to the adjudication of a
creditor’s claims. As this part shows, even where the Code reigns, CISG and the
UCC often clash—and compel the adherence of court and party to an altered
path. So long as such diligence is not observed, precedent will be defied,
international obligations defiled, while too many estates will never dissolve in

28
The specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, set forth in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 inclusive, are
referred to in this Article as “section _” or “§ _” unless otherwise noted.
29
Unless otherwise noted, the term “court” in this Article is to a U.S. Bankruptcy Court. If capitalized
but not the first word in a sentence, it refers to the Supreme Court of the United States.
30
See Jonathan S. Hawkins & Jennifer L. Maffett-Nickelman, The Rise of International Standards in the
Sale of Goods, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2017, at 44.
31
Id.
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essential peace. Unlike the best of sailors, stranded on a becalmed sea, too few
have sensed the faint stirrings of a distant storm.32
I.

A COMEDY OF ERRORS33

In the fall of 2003, an American entrepreneur, Mr. Adams, created five
corporations (individually, Corporation, and collectively Corporations) in
accordance with New York law. With the support of a majority of each entity’s
shareholders, he ascended to the rank of managing director of every Corporation,
assuming control of their collective but still inchoate foreign operations. As
financial analysts will eventually discover, each Corporation was but a shell, and
as a court would later decide, each shell was but an alter ego of Mr. Adams. In
these heady early days, however, artful paperwork obscured these dear verities.
In time, Mr. Adams fabricated a connection between the Corporations and
several foreign entities (collectively, the Parties). In 2004, Mr. Adams, acting on
the formers’ behalves, signed contracts for the production of concrete goods with
a slew of manufacturers based in Hong Kong (Manufacturers). A single Hong
Kong corporation (Trading Co. or Agent),34 itself managed by one natural
person, Ms. Ng (individually, Plaintiff, and collectively, Plaintiffs), negotiated
these arrangements; Trading Co. was also charged with ensuring the goods
produced conformed to explicit and painstakingly specified quality standards set
by Mr. Adams from his offices in New York. For the first five years, no disputes
arose, as the manufacturers produced, the Plaintiffs monitored, and the
corporations sold. In the meantime, in a method commonly employed in certain
industries, the Corporations’ American representative sold the accounts
receivable to various investors, using these accounts as collateral for larger and
larger loans. Neither these purchasers’ identities nor these secondary transfers
were ever disclosed to any person but Mr. Adams, and he alone was privy to
these dizzying exchanges’ every detail. Vagaries aside, this tightening

32

See CARL SAGAN, PALE BLUE DOT: A VISION OF THE HUMAN FUTURE IN SPACE (1994).
The scenario depicted here is based on Lisa Ng v. Adler (In re Adler), 494 B.R. 43 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2013). But for the fact that the debtor’s discharge would be denied pursuant to § 727, the problem detailed in
this Article might have come to pass, making it a tragedy rather than a comedy.
34
Factoring is the sale of receivables to a third party at a discount from their face value. J. LEACH &
RONALD MELICHER, ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE 490 (2014). Under a typical factoring arrangement,
receivables are sold outright from originators (e.g., manufacturers, distributors, or retail dealers) to the factor for
cash at a discount. Barkley Clark, Factoring: Key Issues under the UCC, THE COMMERCIAL FACTOR:
NEWSLETTER FOR THE FACTORING INDUSTRY, Spring 2004, at 1–2. As such, although Mr. Adams referred to
Charming Trading as a “factor,” this plaintiff would be more correctly termed “an agent,” as its activities did
not include the selling of accounts.
33
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relationship and these funds’ fluidity were not unusual occurrences in the world
of international trade and finance.35
Thereafter, conflicts among the Asian manufacturers, the Plaintiffs, and the
Corporations arose. The Corporations, it is later shown, had received goods
without remitting a cent to the Plaintiffs. At the same time, the latter had made
promises to the manufacturers of certain payment based on Mr. Adams’s
purported representations. Ultimately, with the apparent encouragement of Mr.
Adams, the Plaintiffs, Trading Co. as a corporation and Ng as an individual,
employed their own credit to purchase merchandise for the dithering
Corporations and to cover the costs of shipping these goods to the United States.
With the manufacturers still unpaid and the Corporations either unwilling or
unable to pay in full for the merchandise already delivered, Trading Co. and then
Ng eventually defaulted on their multimillion dollar obligations. Professedly
besieged by escalating threats, Ng somehow fled to New York’s Chinatown.
There, financed by unknown sources, she sued the Corporations and Mr. Adams
personally for numerous contract breaches, claiming millions in damages, in the
Commercial Division of the New York Supreme Court for Kings County (“State
Court”). Of the more than dozen counts in the original complaint, the seventh
specifically sought to pierce the Corporations’ veils and render Mr. Adams
directly liable for the promises ostensibly made in their names.36 Based on the
Parties’ filings—and without either Party’s objection—the State Court turned to
New York’s variant of the UCC.
In the midst of pretrial maneuverings, the Code suddenly intruded. In
December 2013, Mr. Adams quietly filed a voluntary individual chapter 7
petition, transforming himself into both a defendant in one state court and a
debtor in a federal one. In response, the State Court severed Mr. Adams from its
case and proceeded to adjudicate the remaining causes of action against the
extant defendants: the Corporations that Mr. Adams effectively controlled. For
reasons never acknowledged, the Corporations were now represented by no
natural person and suddenly bereft of counsel, though Mr. Adams still regularly
appeared, unmoving and uninvolved, as the State Court trial progressed.
Meanwhile, in the Debtor’s first and only bankruptcy case, the Plaintiffs
submitted proofs of claim based on the same contracts on which it had sued in
state court. Indeed, the bases of its proofs of claim against the Debtor were the

35
See generally David B. Tatge & Jeremy B. Tatge, The Fundamentals of Factoring, PRACTICAL LAW:
THE JOURNAL, Sept. 2012.
36
This pleading formulation follows naturally from New York law’s amalgamation of the common law
alter ego doctrine and veil-piercing into one “rule of corporate disregard.” In re Adler, 494 B.R. at 56.
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five causes of action already pleaded, each predicated on the Corporations’ and
Mr. Adams’ alleged UCC violations. Simultaneously, the Plaintiffs initiated an
adversary proceeding pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 700137
to bar the discharge of each alleged debt pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B). For
the next few years, the State Court case against the Corporations and the
bankruptcy case involving Mr. Adams unspooled. Meanwhile, even as the
Plaintiffs prosecuted their action against the Debtor in bankruptcy court, no
Corporation filed a petition under the Code’s eleventh chapter.
II. RELEVANT BANKRUPTCY LAW: THE CODE AND THE RULES
A. Code and Rules
As originally planned and as consistently construed, the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure (“Rules”)38 complement the Code’s sections. As of
October 1, 1979,39 the Code has defined “the creation, alteration or elimination
of substantive rights,”40 while the Rules have “define[d] the process by which
these privileges may be effected”;41 “nearly all procedural matters” having “left
to the Rules . . . .”42 Congress, moreover, “left significant statutory gaps that
implicate various core bankruptcy policies, including fresh-start and distributive
policies, thereby enabling the courts to set policy while engaging in case-by-case

37
The essential features of an adversary proceeding, beyond the ten types listed in Rule 7001, is often
unclear. See Amir Shachmurove, Bankruptcy Rule 7004(h) after Espinosa: A Timely Distinction between
Constitutional and Statutory Service, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, June 2014. Here, it was not.
38
Throughout this Article, the terms “Rule” and “Rules” refer to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, and the terms “federal rule” and “federal rules” refer to all the rules adopted pursuant to the Rules
Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2075 (2012).
39
The Code became effective on this day. See Maiorino v. Branford Sav. Bank, 691 F.2d 89, n.2 (2d Cir.
1982); In re Kutner, 656 F.2d 1107, 1111 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 945, 102 S. Ct. 1443, 71 L. Ed.
2d 658 (1982).
40
Branchburg Plaza Assocs., L.P. v. Fesq (In re Fesq), 153 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Hanover
Indus. Mach. Co. v. Am. Can Co. (In re Hanover Indus. Mach. Co.), 61 B.R. 551, 552 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986)),
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1018 (1999); see also, e.g., Asher v. Am. Mortg. Servicing Inc. (In re Asher), 488 B.R.
58, 70 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting In re Fesq, 153 F.3d at 116); Parker v. Bain (In re Parker), 68 F.3d
1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing In re Hanover Indus. Mach. Co., 61 B.R. at 552).
41
In re Fesq, 153 F.3d at 116; see also, e.g., Marshall v. PNC Bank, N.A. (In re Marshall), 491 B.R. 217,
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2012) (quoting SLW Capital, LLC v. Mansaray-Ruffin (In re Masaray-Ruffin), 530 F.3d 230,
237–38 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted)); Phillips v. First City, Tx. (In re Phillips), 966 F.2d 926, 934 (5th Cir.
1992) (citing In re Hanover Indus. Mach. Co., 61 B.R. at 552); John J. Murphy, The Essence of Bankruptcy
Procedure, 90 COM. L.J. 442, 443 (1985) (“The . . . Rules govern the procedure in bankruptcy . . . .”).
42
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 449 (1977); In re Tallerico, 532 B.R. 774, 785–86, n.17 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
2015); In re Searles, 70 B.R. 266, 271 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1987) (citing this history as support for the view “that the
. . . Rules cannot limit the operation of the bankruptcy statutes”).

SHACHMUROVE GALLEYPROOFS

2018]

CISG AS THE MEASURE OF A CLAIM’S VALUE

6/14/2018 3:41 PM

471

dispute resolution.”43 Due to the Code’s persistent ambiguities and the Rules’
procedural, albeit cabined, primacy, these two sources must often be construed
together as discrete parts of an interlocking and integrated legal framework.44
However, “[w]hen in conflict, the . . . Code trumps the . . . Rules”45 is the
unmistakable mandate embodied in the Rules Enabling Act.46 Still, with much
effort, courts have striven to avoid such inconsistency by means of varied canons
and presumptions.47
B. Determination of a Claim’s Validity and Value
Operating concurrently, §§ 501 and 502 and the Rules govern the means by
which creditors and equity security holders present their claims or interests to a
bankruptcy court and set forth the guidelines according to which claims are to
be allowed or disallowed.48
Section 501 and Rules 3001, 3002, 3003, 3004, 3005, and 3006 specify how
and when a proof must or may be filed; these timeliness requirements are
intended “to aid in the orderly and efficient administration of bankruptcy
cases.”49 Per § 501(a), a creditor or indenture trustee “may file a proof of
claim.”50 Per paragraphs (b) and (c), a party liable to a creditor with the debtor

43
Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60
UCLA L. REV. 384, 402 (2012); cf. Steven W. Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causes of Delay and Expense in Chapter
11 Bankruptcy Cases, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 294 (1993).
44
This approach aligns with the courts’ general treatment of procedural rules. See, e.g., Amir
Shachmurove, Disruptions’ Function: A Defense of (Some) Form Objections under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 12 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 161, 194–97 (Spring 2016).
45
In re Logan Place Props, Ltd., 327 B.R. 811, 815 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (collecting cases).
46
28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2014); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978); Amir
Shachmurove, Purchasing Claims and Changing Votes: Establishing “Cause” under Rule 3018(a), 89 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 511, 538–41 (2015) [hereinafter Shachmurove, Claims].
47
Shachmurove, Claims, supra note 46, at 528–31.
48
11 U.S.C. §§ 501, 502 (2014); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001–3008; In re Tucker, 174 B.R. 732, 741 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1994) (“Whether a claim is eligible to be considered under § 502 depends first on whether the claim
has been properly and timely filed. Only after a proper filing per § 501 and a timely filing per Rule 3002
(incorporated into § 501), may a claim be considered under § 502’s standards regarding disallowance.”).
49
In re Macias, 195 B.R. 659, 662 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996); cf. Leadbetter v. Snyder (In re Snyder), 544
B.R. 905, 910 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2016) (in seeking to resolve the apparent conflict between § 523(a)(3) and
§ 726(a)(2)(C), observing that many courts “start with the premise that the central purpose of the Bankruptcy
Code is to allow the debtor to reorder his or her affairs and enjoy a fresh start”).
50
11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012); In re Makwa Builders, LLC, No. 12-13664, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 355, at
*32 & n.15 (Bankr. D.N.M. Feb. 4, 2016); see also, e.g., Hilton v. US Bank (In re Hilton), 544 B.R. 1, 16–17
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2016) (explaining the claim allowance process for filing and disputing claim set forth in § 501
and § 502).
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and the debtor itself, respectively, may file a proof if the claim holder does not
do so in a timely manner.51
Not these Code sections, with their discretionary “may,”52 but manifold rules
offer more thorough guidance. If a debtor has scheduled a creditor’s specific
obligation, the amount stated on Schedule D, E, or F constitutes prima facie
evidence of the claim’s validity and amount unless it is scheduled as “disputed,
contingent, or unliquidated.”53 The necessity of filing a proof of claim, “a written
statement setting forth a creditor’s claim” that “shall conform substantially to
the appropriate official form,” depends on the particular Code chapter.54 In cases
under chapters 7, 12, and 13, an unsecured creditor or an equity security holder
must submit such a proof within 90 days after the first date set for the meeting
of the creditors required by § 341(a) except for certain explicitly defined
exceptions.55 In a chapter 9 or a chapter 11 case, a proof need be filed only if
either the claim is listed in the debtor’s official schedules as disputed, contingent,
or unliquidated, or the creditor disagrees with the amount of the claim listed in
the debtor’s schedules.56 For all chapters, if a creditor fails to file a proof, a
debtor or trustee may do so “within 30 days of the expiration of the time for
filing such claims prescribed by Rule 3002(c) or 3003(c)”;57 in these
circumstances, any entity liable or potentially liable to a creditor may file a proof
on that creditor’s behalf within the same timeframe.58 Once a proof is filed, the

51
11 U.S.C. §§ 501(b)–(c) (2012); see, e.g., Matteson v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Matteson), 535 B.R.
156, 164 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2015) (citing § 501(c)); Denke v. PNC Bank, N.A. (In re Denke), 524 B.R. 644, 651
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2015) (citing § 501(b)).
52
See, e.g., Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (“[T]he
mandatory ‘shall’ . . . normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.”); Rastelli v. Warden,
Metro. Corr. Ctr., 782 F.2d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The use of a permissive verb – ‘may review’ instead of ‘shall
review’—suggests a discretionary rather than mandatory review process.”).
53
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(a); Banco Latino Int’l v. Gomez-Lopez (In re Banco Latino Int’l), 310 B.R.
780, 786 n.9 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (distinguishing between Rule 3002, “the claims processing rule that applies to
Chapter 7 and 13 cases,” and Rule 3003, which applies to chapter 9 and 11 cases).
54
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(a); Am. Express Bank, FSB v. Askenaizer (In re Plourde), 418 B.R. 495, 503–
04 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2009) (citing Rule 3001(a) and adding that “the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,
which provide the procedural framework for the filing and allowance of claims, regulate the form, content, and
attachments for proofs of claim”).
55
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(a), (c); see In re Gonzalez Aleman, 499 B.R. 236, 239–40 (Bankr. D.P.R.
2013) (discussing these paragraphs’ interplay).
56
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003; Pioneer Invs. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380,
382–83 (1993). This distinction resembles the one made between “liability or amount” in § 303(b). 11 U.S.C.
§§ 303(b)(1), (h)(1) (2012).
57
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3004; McDermott v. Davis (In re Davis), 538 B.R. 368, 382 n.8 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
2015).
58
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3005(a); Morton v. Morton (In re Morton), 298 B.R. 301, 305 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.
2003).
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value stated therein supersedes the amount scheduled by the debtor,59 but if a
proof is subsequently disallowed for lack of timeliness, the claim as scheduled
will be reinstated for purposes of the estate’s distribution.60 A proof and thereby
a claim may be withdrawn, though the holder’s obligations vary depending on
whether an objection has been lodged or an adversary proceeding has been
inaugurated.61 If a claimant follows the foregoing process, a claim is born.
Such a filing triggers the allowance and disallowance process specified in
the Code and the Rules.62 As with a claim actually scheduled,63 a proof filed in
conformity with the Rules constitutes prima facie evidence of the claim’s
“validity” and “amount.”64 The claim memorialized in such a proof is deemed
allowed “unless a party in interest, including a creditor of a general partner in a
partnership that is a debtor in a case under chapter 7 of this title, objects.”65 In
making such a protestation, so as to rebut a proof’s presumptive validity or
amount, a debtor or trustee must produce sufficiently substantial evidence.66
Once such evidence is presented, the burden shifts, and the claimant must now
prove the claim’s validity by a preponderance of the evidence.67 Regardless of

59
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(c)(4); Bateman v. S. Dev. Corp. (In re Bateman), 435 B.R. 600, 611 (Bankr.
E.D. Ark. 2010) (quoting Rule 3003(c)(4)).
60
Pioneer Invs. Servs. Co., 507 U.S. at 382–83.
61
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3006; Smith v. Dowden, 47 F.3d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he successful
withdrawal of a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3006 prior to the trustee’s initiation of an adversarial
proceeding renders the withdrawn claim a legal nullity and leaves the parties as if the claim had never been
brought.”).
62
Filing also establishes the bankruptcy court’s subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the dispute
and the relevant parties. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (2012); Bankruptcy Servs. v. Ernst & Young (In re CBI
Holding Co.), 529 F.3d 432, 459–60 (2d Cir. 2008); Arnold Print Works, Inc. v. Apkin (In re Arnold Print
Works, Inc.), 815 F.2d 165, 167 (1987).
63
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(a); Official Comm. of Asbestos Claimants v. G-I Holdings, Inc. (In re G-I
Holdings, Inc.), 295 B.R. 211, 221 (D.N.J. 2003).
64
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(f); see also, e.g., In re S. Side House, LLC, 451 B.R. 248, 260 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Rule 3001(f)); In re Euliano, 442 B.R. 177, 181 & n.9 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) (holding
that the value of the claim is settled due to the debtor’s failure to object). Claims not so filed are not entitled to
this presumption. See, e.g., Caplan v. B-Line, LLC (In re Kirkland), 572 F.3d 838, 840–41 (10th Cir. 2009),
cited with approval in Brown v. Ameriquest Funding II, LLC (In re Brown), 431 B.R. 309, 310 & n.1 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 2010).
65
11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012).
66
See, e.g., Creamer v. Motors Liquidation Co. GUC Trust (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), No. 12 Civ.
6074 (RJS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143957, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2013); In re Oneida Ltd., 400 B.R. 384,
389 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 954 F.2d 167, 173–74 (3d Cir. 1992); Wright v. Holm
(In re Holm), 931 F.2d 620, 623 (9th Cir. 1991).
67
See, e.g., In re Motors Liquidation Co., No. 12 Civ. 6074 (RJS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143957, at
*12–13; In re Oneida Ltd., 400 B.R. at 389; In re Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 954 F.2d at 173–74; In re Holm, 931
F.2d at 623.
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who must adduce sufficient proof, however, the claimant always bears the
burden of persuasion.68
Section 502(b) sets forth the grounds for a claim’s disallowance and thus the
process for proving—or disproving—its legal validity.69 In accordance with this
Code subsection,70 when determining whether to disallow a proof, applicable
nonbankruptcy law establishes the validity of a creditor’s bankruptcy claim.
Pursuant to § 502(b)(1) in particular, a claim may be disallowed if “such claim
is unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any
agreement or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is
contingent or matured.”71 Because “[a] claim [only] arises for purposes of
bankruptcy when the relationship between the debtor and the creditor contained
all of the elements necessary to give rise to a legal obligation . . . under the
relevant non-bankruptcy law,”72 a court must first look to the law that gave rise
to the specific claim.73 Necessarily, that court must consider any potential
dispositive defenses available under this applicable nonbankruptcy law.74 For
this very reason, in spite of Congress’ constitutional preeminence over “the
subject of Bankruptcies,”75 external legal strictures still often comprise “the

68
E.g., United States v. Braunstein (In re Pan), 209 B.R. 152, 155–56 (D. Mass. 1997); Juniper Dev. Grp.
v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transp., Inc.), 993 F.2d 915, 925 (1st Cir. 1993).
69
In re MacFarland, 462 B.R. 857, 879–80 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011); see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at
352 (1977) (“Subsection (b) prescribes the grounds on which a claim may be disallowed.”), quoted in In re
Interco, Inc., 137 B.R. 1003, 1005 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992).
70
Most, but not all, courts have held that only one of the nine statutory reasons enumerated in § 502(b)
may be invoked. See In re MacFarland, 462 B.R. 857, 880 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) (“[T]he growing majority of
courts and appellate courts have 28 U.S.C. § 2075 and 11 U.S.C. §502(b) as giving no discretion to disallow a
claim for any reason other than those stated in § 502.”); Frontier Ins. Co. v. Westport Ins. Corp. (In re Black),
460 B.R. 407, 416 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011) (same); Dove-Nation v. eCast Settlement Corp. (In re Dove-Nation),
318 B.R. 147, 152 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2004) (same).
71
11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (2012).
72
Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Esso Virgin Is., Inc. (In re Duplan Corp.), 212 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 2000)
(quoting LTV Steel Co. v. Shalala (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 53 F.3d 478, 497 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation
marks omitted), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 913 (1995)). An interesting counterexample to this dominant approach
arises in the area of mass tort bankruptcies.
73
B-Real, LLC v. Melillo (In re Melillo), 392 B.R. 1, 5–6 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2008).
74
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of America v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 450 (2007) (“This
provision is most naturally understood to provide that, with limited exceptions, any defense to a claim that is
available outside of the bankruptcy context is also available in bankruptcy.”); accord Glatzer v. Enron Corp.,
No. 04 Civ. 4897 (DAB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78696, at * 12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008) (citing Travelers,
549 U.S. at 450).
75
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also, e.g., Lawrence Ponoroff, Constitutional Limitations on StateEnacted Bankruptcy Exemption Legislation and the Long Overdue Case for Uniformity, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J.
353, 355–61 (2014); Randolph J. Haines, The Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy Is Different, 77 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 129, 197 (2003).
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appropriate law for determining the validity of an underlying claim” under the
Code.76
Just as a court must turn to non-Code law to ascertain a claim’s validity, it
must rely on this same law to ascertain its value. Assuming the prerequisites
specified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(c) and (e) are met,77 § 502(c) allows a court to
estimate any contingent or unliquidated claim for purposes of allowance if either
the fixing or liquidation of such claim would “unduly delay the administration
of the case” or the creditor’s right to payment arises from “a right to an equitable
remedy for breach of performance.”78 In contract actions specifically, for an
accurate estimate of a claim’s value to be made, a court must weigh both the
governing instrument’s precise language and the controlling statutory scheme,79
as both sources delimitate the maximum damages permitted upon a contract’s
breach. As with an analysis of validity pursuant to § 502(b)(1), a court is “bound
by the substantive law that governs the ultimate value of the claim.”80
C. Temporary Valuation Pursuant to Rule 3018(a)
If a court wishes to avoid prematurely invalidating “problematical or nonexistent” claims81 or from delaying a chapter 11 case by invoking the
cumbersome estimation procedures mandated by §§ 501 and 502,82 Rule
3018(a) offers a temporary solution. In effect, despite the close logical (and

76
First City Beaumont v. Durkay (In re Ford), 967 F.2d 1047, 1053 n.6 (5th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added)
(citing, among others, Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979), and Prudence Realization Corp. v. Greist,
316 U.S. 89, 95 (1942)); see also, e.g., Fairchild Dornier GmbH v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In
re Dornier Aviation (N. Am.), Inc.), 453 F.3d 225, 232 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Disallowance of a claim under § 502(b)
is only appropriate when the claimant has no rights vis-a-vis the bankrupt, i.e., when there is ‘no basis in fact or
law’ for any recovery from the debtor.” (emphasis in original) (quoting Diasonics, Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626,
631 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990); In re Shelter Enters., 98 B.R. 224, 229 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (“Although the
judgment notes appear both valid on their faces and enforceable by Owoc under applicable state law, it is the
duty of this Court to look behind those judgments to the validity of the underlying claims . . . . State substantive
law determines the existence of a claim.” (citation omitted)).
77
28 U.S.C. § 157(c), (e) (2012).
78
11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1)–(2) (2012).
79
In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 560–61 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997).
80
In re Texans CUSO Ins. Grp., LLC, 426 B.R. 194, 204 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010) (relying in part on
Bittner v. Borne Chem. Co. Inc., 691 F.2d 134, 135 (3d Cir. 1982)); Official Comm. of Asbestos Claimants v.
Asbestos Prop. Damage Comm. (In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc.), 330 B.R. 133, 155 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005)
(citing for support Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000)).
81
In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 145 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996); see also In re Miami Trucolor
Offset Serv. Co., 187 B.R. 767, 768 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) (describing § 1126(a), § 502, and Rule 3018(a) as
part of the same statutory framework).
82
See infra Part II.B.
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statutory) link between Rule 3018(a) and § 502(c),83 the former allows a claim
to be temporarily allowed, its validity assumed, “[n]otwithstanding objection to
a claim or interest.”84
Although estimation pursuant to Rule 3018(a) lies within the trial court’s
“sound discretion,”85 at least two constraints on its invocation can be mined from
its explicit text and scattered precedent. First, while “a temporary allowance
order only arises if there is an objection to a claim,”86 the claim temporarily
allowed must be, at worst, the subject of an “unresolved objection” under
§ 502.87 Second, the “amount” pegged must be that “which the court deems
proper for the purpose of accepting or rejecting a plan”88 as determined by
utilizing “the method best suited to the circumstances of the case.”89 Regardless
of what a purely economic analysis would indicate, estimation under Rule
3018(a) must respect the “obvious and dominating purposes” of the Code’s
reorganization chapters—a debtor’s timely reorganization and deserving
creditors’ prompt pro rata repayment90—and the rationale posited for this
particular safety valve: “[T]o prevent possible abuse by plan proponents who
might ensure acceptance of a plan by filing last minute objections to the claims
of dissenting creditor.”91 Inevitably, as elsewhere, courts consult the pertinent
substantive law.92

83
See, e.g., Goldsmith v. LBM Fin. LLC (In re Loucheschi LLC), No. 11-42578-MSH, 2013 Bankr.
LEXIS 4811, at *38–39 (Bankr. D. Mass. Nov. 13, 2013).
84
FED. R. BANKR. 3018(a). For a detailed discussion of this oft-mangled rule, see Shachmurove, Claims,
supra note 46.
85
In re Lichtin/Wade LLC, No. 12-00845-8-RDD, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 1719, at *7 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
Apr. 26, 2013); accord In re Mangia Pizza Invs. LP, 480 B.R. 669, 679 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2012).
86
Armstrong v. Rushton (In re Armstrong), 294 B.R. 344, 354 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2003), aff’d, 97 F. App’x
295 (10th Cir. 2004).
87
In re Pulp Finish 1 Co., No. 12-13775 (SMB), 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 189, at *7 n.1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 16, 2014) (emphasis in original); accord Jacksonville Airport Inc. v. Michkeldel, Inc., 434 F.3d 729, 732
(4th Cir. 2006); see also In re Motel Assocs. of Cincinnati, 50 B.R. 196, 199 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
88
FED. R. BANKR. 3018(a).
89
In re Ralph Lauren Womenswear, Inc., 197 B.R. 771, 775 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
90
In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff’d, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989).
91
In re Armstrong, 294 B.R. at 354; see also, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Enron Corp., No. 04
Civ. 5499 (HB), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21810, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2004) (affirming bankruptcy court
opinion, as it prevented a single creditor from “improperly control[ing] the vote and confirmation of the
reorganization plan to the detriment of other creditors”).
92
See In re Bellucci, 119 B.R. 763, 777 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990) (in denying a motion for reconsideration
of a sua sponte order to abstain, emphasizing that “[t]he fact of bankruptcy does not change the substantive law
that applies to the merits of a claim” and justifying deferral to state appellate court as the relevant “objection to
[a] claim relate[d] entirely to the underlying state law dispute, no federal question is presented”).
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D. Nondischargeability of Claims under § 523(a)(2)
With equal sureness, applicable non-bankruptcy law impacts the
adjudication of the discharge exceptions encoded in § 523(a)(2). Both
subsections prohibit a discharge pursuant to §§ 727,93 1141,94 1228(b),95 and
1328(b)96 “for money property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing
of credit, to the extent obtained by” one of two delineated misdeeds.97 The two
subsections, “[i]t is well-established,” are mutually exclusive,98 though they
share a purpose: both “retributive and protective,”99 “to prevent the dishonest
debtor’s attempt to use the law’s protections to shield his or her wrongdoing,”100
a hoary notion embedded in the very fabric of American bankruptcy law.101 Per
Rule 7001, “a proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt” under
§ 523(a)(2) is “[a]n adversary proceeding,”102 in which the creditor bears the
burden of proof103 by a preponderance of the evidence.104
1. Section 523(a)(2)(A)
Pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A), a debtor will not be discharged from any debt
traceable to “false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a
93

11 U.S.C. § 727 (2012).
Id. § 1141.
95
Id. § 1228(b).
96
Id. § 1328(c).
97
Id. § 523(a)(2); see, e.g., Gertsch v. Johnson & Johnson (In re Gertsch), 237 B.R. 160, 167 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1999); Siriani v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. (In re Siriani), 967 F.2d 302, 304 n.1 (9th Cir. 1992).
98
McCrary v. Barrack (In re Barrack), 217 B.R. 598, 605 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998); accord, e.g., Land Inv.
Club, Inc. v. Lauer (In re Lauer), 371 F.3d 406, 413 (8th Cir. 2004); Eugene Parks Law Corp. Defined Benefit
Pension Plan v. Kirsh (In re Kirsh), 973 F.2d 1454, 1457 (9th Cir. 1992).
99
Century 21 Balfour Real Estate v. Menna (In re Menna), 16 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1994) (emphasis in
original).
100
In re Gans, 75 B.R. 474, 481 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing In re
Newmark, 20 B.R. 842, 852 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982)); accord, e.g., Apte v. Japra (In re Apte), 96 F.3d 1319,
1322 (9th Cir. 1996) (“A central purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to allow an honest but unfortunate debtor to
get a fresh start. . . . A dishonest debtor, on the other hand, will not benefit from his wrongdoing.” (citations
omitted) (citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991), and Citibank (S.D.), N.A. v. Eashai (In re
Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 1996)); In re Union Bank, 127 B.R. 514, 517 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting
In re Gans, 75 B.R. at 481).
101
Marrama v. Citizens Bank, 549 U.S. 365, 374–75 (2007); Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 706 (1877); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison) (“The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately
connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property
may lie or be removed into different States, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question.”
(emphasis added)).
102
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6); Greene v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 770 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2014).
103
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4005; Hathaway v. OSB Mfg., Inc. (In re Hathaway), 364 B.R. 220, 231 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 2007).
104
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 291 (1991).
94
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statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition.”105 Whether
the misdeed alleged is deemed a pretense, a misrepresentation, or a fraud,106
courts typically require proof of the same four elements: (1) the debtor made a
representation; (2) this representation was false and the debtor knew of its falsity
at the time of its making; (3) the creditor actually and justifiably relied upon the
debtor’s representation; and (4) the creditor sustained a loss or was proximately
damaged as a result of that representation.107 In four distinct ways, this standard,
unmistakably lodged within the Code’s statutory corpus, incorporates nonbankruptcy law.
First, while affirmative misrepresentations are often involved in actions
under § 523(a)(2)(A), a debt may also be deemed nondischargeable under this
subsection on the basis of a debtor’s “concealment or fraudulent omission of a
material fact.”108 It is, indeed, widely accepted “that silence, or concealment of
a material fact, can be the basis of a false impression which creates a
misrepresentation actionable under § 523(a)(2)(A).”109 When omissions are at
issue, the crucial question is whether “the debtor was under a duty to disclose
and possessed an intent to deceive.”110 Such a duty to disclose “facts basic to the
transaction,” in turn, arises if the debtor “knows that the other is about to enter
into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the relationship
between them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would
reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts.”111 Simply put, “customs of trade”
and “other objective circumstances,” both external sources of legal guidance as
to a concrete duty’s delineation, may play a critical role in defining a legal duty’s
existence and thereby the debtor’s liability for his or her silent breach under
§ 523(a)(2)(B).112 To divine either, non-bankruptcy law must be consulted.

105

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012).
Though phrased in the disjunctive, many have seen the terms “false pretenses” and “false
representation” as equivalent to “actual fraud,” the former two therefore not amounting to separate grounds for
a debt’s nondischaregability. E.g., Mandalay Resort Grp. v. Miller (In re Miller), 310 B.R. 185, 188–189 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 2004) (so characterizing Ninth Circuit law). Purely as a matter of statutory interpretation, this choice
remains a dubious one.
107
George H. Singer, Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Fundamentals of Nondischargeability in
Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L. J. 325, 332–33 (1997).
108
Huskey v. Tolman (In re Tolman), 491 B.R. 138, 151 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2013).
109
Stennis v. Davis (In re Davis), 486 B.R. 182, 191 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013).
110
Apte v. Japra (In re Apte), 96 F.3d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1996).
111
Id. at 1324 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1976)). Tellingly, in Field v. Mans, the
Supreme Court turned to this same section of the Restatement to define the reliance required under
§ 523(a)(2)(A). Id. (“The Supreme Court in Field looked to the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1976) as ‘the
most widely accepted distillation of the common law of torts’ at the relevant time.”).
112
See Cutcliff v. Reuter (In re Reuter), 427 B.R. 727, 744 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2010).
106
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Second, so as to establish the requisite “intent to deceive” under
§ 523(a)(2)(A), courts look towards those omnipresent “badges of fraud,” a type
of circumstantial evidence often needed due to the rarity of a debtor admitting
to the possession of a fraudulent motive.113 Among the plethora of such indicia
recognized by sundry courts,114 “[f]or purposes of § 523(a)(2)(A), a common
badge of fraud concerns whether a defendant made any effort to perform their
obligation.”115 Furthermore, “the greater the extent of a debtor’s performance,
the less likely it will be that they possessed an intent to defraud.”116 Naturally
and logically, then, the source of a debtor’s obligation will not be the Code but
the contract that the debtor signed—and the operative law applicable to such
contracts and transactions, most especially any obligations and duties that it
thrust as a matter of course on the prepetition debtor. As such, federal or state
common and statutory law must be consulted for a party’s contractual duties to
be precisely denoted and, if a violation thereby be found, a pivotal badge be
established.117
Third, demarcating the outer boundaries of justifiable reliance may
occasionally, albeit not invariably, require dissection of such non-bankruptcy
law. Unlike § 523(a)(2)(B), § 523(a)(2)(A) specifies no standard, and due to this
presumptively intentional exclusion of such language in the latter, the Court has
imputed a “justifiable reliance” requirement to § 523(a)(2)(A).118
“Justification,” the Court noted, “is a matter of the qualities and characteristics
of the particular plaintiff, and the circumstances of the particular case.”119
Nonetheless, if the relevant facts should have been discerned by the creditor—
“a person cannot purport to rely on preposterous representations or close his eyes

113

Caspers v. Van Horne (In re Van Horne), 823 F.2d 1285, 1287 (8th Cir. 1987).
See Lisa Ng v. Adler (In re Adler), 494 B.R. 43, 65–66 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2014) (enumerating six for
purposes of § 727(a)(2)(A)).
115
Bartson v. Marroquin (In re Marroquin), 441 B.R. 586, 593 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010).
116
Ewing v. Bissonette (In re Bissonette), 398 B.R. 189, 194 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008).
117
See, e.g., Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 28 (1977) (holding that when a federal statute governs,
“[t]he necessity of uniformity of decision demands that federal common law, rather than state law, control the
contract’s interpretation”); Visteon Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 777 F.3d 415, 418 (7th Cir.
2015) (citing Indiana’s uniform-contract-interpretation approach, “which applies the law of a single state to the
whole contract even though [the contract] covers multiple risks in multiple states” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
118
Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 61 (1995).
119
Id. at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1976));
see also, e.g., Vermont Plastics v. Brine, Inc., 79 F.3d 272, 277–78 (2d Cir. 1996).
114
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to avoid discovery of the truth”120—blind reliance will not be justifiable
reliance.121
This understanding of “justifiable reliance” is rooted in “the common law of
torts”; to this external law, courts have repeatedly turned to establish the limits
of justifiability.122 Based on this substantial precedent, the extent to which an
allegedly wronged party’s reliance was justifiable will frequently depend on the
nature of the parties’ contractual agreement and the applicable non-bankruptcy
law which governs its interpretation.123 Reflecting a tendency that further
justifies this approach, courts have not hesitated to rely on state common and
statutory law in applying § 523(a)(2) to a particular debtor,124 as they have often
done in regards to any substantive legal issue not expressly and fully settled by
the Code’s positive text.125 In sum, however unintentional the result,
nonbankruptcy law, as written and interpreted, must often inform any analysis
of justifiable reliance.126 Logic compels no less, as only from its substantive
content can the outer bounds which no person of the same age, experience,
sophistication, education, and capacity as the alleged creditor can claim to have
rightly crossed can be espied.
Finally, any calculation of damages demands an analysis identical to that
necessary to estimate a claim. By necessity, if a creditor prevails on a
§ 523(a)(2)(A) action, a court must estimate the claim’s size.127 To make that
120
Romesh Japa, M.D., F.A.C.C., Inc. v. Apte (In re Apte), 180 B.R. 223, 229 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Eugene Parks Law Corp. Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Kirsh (In
re Kirsh), 973 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir. 1992)), cited with approval, Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. Eashai (In re
Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 1996).
121
Am. Express Centurion Bank v. Owens (In re Owens), No. 12-19125-B-7, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 5146,
at *17 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2013) (summarizing precedent and collecting cases).
122
Huskey v. Tolman (In re Tolman), 491 B.R. 138, 152 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2013).
123
See, e.g., Walid v. Yolanda for Irene Couture, 40 A.3d 85, 91 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012); Butler
v. Yusem, 44 So. 3d 102, 105 (Fla. 2010); Toy v. Metro Life Ins., Co., 928 A.2d 186, 207–08 (Pa. 2007); Moore
v. Daw, No. CT 95-20, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 3763, at *13 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 20, 1996); Koral Indus. v.
Sec. Conn. Life Ins., Co., 802 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tex. 1990); Keywell Corp. v. Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159, 164 (2d
Cir. 1994); Smith v. Ethell, 494 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ill App. Ct. 1986); Hartong v. Partak, Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d
942, 964–65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
124
See, e.g., Bancboston Mortg. Corp. v. Ledford, 127 B.R. 175, 184–85 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1991)
(relying on Tennessee law regarding when fraud may be imputed to a partner and collecting similar cases).
125
Daniel A. Austin, The Bankruptcy Clause and the Eleventh Amendment: An Uncertain Boundary
Between Federalism and State Sovereignty, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 383, 395 (2007).
126
Cf. INGEBORG SCHWENZER, PASCAL IACHEM & CHRISTOPHER KEE, GLOBAL SALES AND CONTRACT
LAW 396 (2012).
127
E.g., Baker Dev. Corp. v. Mulder (In re Mulder), 307 B.R. 637, 641 n.5 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2004) (“A
bankruptcy court can enter a money judgment in a nondischargeability action.”); Cowen v. Kennedy (In re
Kennedy), 108 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that “the bankruptcy court acted within its jurisdiction
in entering a monetary judgment against . . . [the debtor] in conjunction with a finding that the debt was non-
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accurate determination, especially if punitive damages may be claimed as a
matter of law, courts have long looked to the non-bankruptcy law governing the
relevant transaction that begot the debt already found non-dischargeable per
§ 523(a)(2)(A).128
2. Section 523(a)(2)(B)
Seen simultaneously as an amendment and a codification of existing law,129
§ 523(a)(2)(B)130 forecloses the discharge of a debt upon the establishment of
seven elements: (1) “use of a statement in writing” that was (2) “material” and
(3) “false,” (4) “respecting a debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition,” (5)
“on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable . . . reasonably relied,” (6)
“that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to deceive,”131 and
(7) that proximately caused damages to the complaining creditor.132 As a federal
statute, non-bankruptcy law may affect this section’s interpretation in three
ways.
First, and maybe most clearly, “[r]easonable reliance is an objective test
requiring conduct consistent with the standard of a reasonable man,”133 the term
effectively “connot[ing] the use of the standard of ordinary and average
person.”134 Logically, if a controlling law or a written agreement forecloses the
possibility of reliance during a specified class of transactions, “a community
standard of conduct”135 such as that encoded in § 523(a)(2)(B) would
automatically categorize such reliance as unreasonable, making proof of
nondischargeability impossible. Similarly, if a contract defines the outer bounds
dischargeable” under § 523(a)(2)(A)); N.I.S. Corp. v. Hallahan (In re Hallahan), 936 F.2d 1496, 1508 (7th Cir.
1991) (“We think it preferable to allow bankruptcy courts ruling on the dischargeability of a debt to adjudicate
the issues of liability and damages also.”). If the case involved a denial of discharge predicated on § 727, no
need to compute damages would exist. See Genesee Reg’l Bank v. Rinaudo (In re Rinaudo), 418 B.R. 42, 47
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2009).
128
See, e.g., Klaus v. Thompson (In re Klaus), 181 B.R. 487, 492 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (looking to
California law regarding the awarding of punitive damages).
129
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 130 (1977) (“Current law provides a nearly identical exception to discharge.
The differences are that current law does not cover a debt for services, and requires only reliance, not reasonable
reliance, by the creditor on the statement.”).
130
For ease, this section first discusses paragraph (B) rather than (A).
131
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B)(i)–(iv) (2012).
132
Candland v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. (In re Candland), 90 F.3d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1996) (rewording 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) and citing Siriani v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. (In re Siriani), 967 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1992)).
133
Res GA Two, LLC v. Hiett (In re Hiett), No. 12-80560-DHW, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 4179, at *22 (Bankr.
M.D. Ala. Sept. 30, 2014).
134
City Bank & Trust Co. v. Vann (In re Vann), 67 F.3d 277, 280 (11th Cir. 1995).
135
Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 71 (1995) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 545A, Comment b (2nd
1979)).
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of reliance by assigning the relevant burden to the objecting creditor or by either
stating or importing a very narrow definition from an external legal scheme, “the
ordinary and average person” would not be able to maintain the reasonableness
of their reliance on a debtor’s representations.
Second, because “[t]he concept of ‘materiality’ . . . includes objective and
subjective components,”136 whether a financial statement is “materially false,”
meaning “that [it] paints a substantially untruthful picture of the debtor’s
financial condition . . . [i.e.,] a significant understatement of liabilities or
exaggeration of assets,”137 may often depend on what non-bankruptcy law
allows a contracting party to assume to be true or obliges the debtor to verify or
vouchsafe. If so, then a debtor’s reckless representation regarding his or her
financial ability to satisfy such elements may readily satisfy § 523(a)(2)(B)’s
materiality requirement.
Finally, damages must always “be proven with specificity and cannot be
speculative or conjectural.”138 Accordingly, as with estimation under § 502 or
Rule 3018(a),139 once a claim is found to be non-dischargeable per
§ 523(a)(2)(B), a court must turn to the relevant contract or controlling law to
peg an appropriate amount. For these four reasons, non-bankruptcy strictures
once more play a pivotal role in a discharge subsection’s construal in a specific
case or proceeding.140

E. Caveat: Multiplying Universes
Of course, the foregoing points to only a handful of those instances in which
external law governs substantive decisions otherwise bounded by the Code’s
explicit provisions. Others, in fact, can be found, including, for example,
§ 503(b)(9). More importantly, even where no such explicit referral appears, the
underlying principles behind such non-bankruptcy provisions can (and often do)
influence a court’s interpretive approach, impelling subtle methodological
variations, in a protean host of unpredictable cases. To wit, sometime, even when
no definite answer can be gleaned from the relevant compendium, the law’s
spirit gives some direction and excludes certain possibilities by implication. As
136
Fairfax State Sav. Bank v. McCleary (In re McCleary), 284 B.R. 876, 885 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2002)
(citing Ramsey Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Dammen (In re Dammen), 167 B.R. 545, 551 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1994)).
137
Guaranty Residential Lending, Inc. v. Koep (In re Koep), 334 B.R. 364, 373 (Bankr. D. Md. 2005).
138
Huskey v. Tolman (In re Tolman), 491 B.R. 138, 156 n.43 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2013); cf. Jill Stuart (Asia)
LLC v. Sanei Int’l Co., 566 F. App’x 29, 32 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing contract damages under New York law).
139
See supra Part III.A.1–2.
140
Cf. Steven W. Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causes of Delay and Expense in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases,
67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 294 (1993).
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shown below, CISG, a treaty shockingly opaque as to certain issues but
surprisingly exhaustive as to others, may have precisely such an effect.141
III. CONSTRUCTION OF TREATIES GENERALLY AND CISG PARTICULARLY
A. General Rules
As with a statute142 and a rule,143 a treaty’s interpretation begins with its
language.144 “[C]lear treaty language” and hence plain and unambiguous
meaning145 is dispositive “absent extraordinarily strong contrary evidence.”146
Subject to this generally applicable paradigm, treaty interpretation initially
makes use of numerous semantic and syntactic precepts, including the expressio
unius est exclusio alterius,147 noscitur a sociis,148 ejusdem generis,149 and
absurdity150 canons and the last antecedent151 and series qualifier152 rules, and

141

See Hawkins & Maffett-Nickelman, supra note 30, at 45.
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 235, 243, 245–46 (2010); United
States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
143
Shachmurove, Claims, supra note 46, at 527–31.
144
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
145
The definitional differences between the terms “plain” and “unambiguous” often relies on an assiduous
attentiveness to the distinction between denotation and connotation. Amir Shachmurove, Sherlock’s Admonition:
Vindicatory Contempts as Criminal Actions for Purposes of Bankruptcy Code § 362, 13 DEPAUL BUS. & COM.
L.J. 67, 77–78 (2014) [hereinafter Shachmurove, Sherlock].
146
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982) (“When the parties to a treaty both
agree as to the meaning of a treaty provision, and that interpretation follows from the clear treaty language, we
must, absent extraordinarily strong contrary evidence, defer to that interpretation.”); accord Forestal Guarani
S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 398 (3d Cir. 2010).
147
POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2014) (citing Setser v. United States,
566 U.S. 231, 461–62 (explaining the canon, which stands for the proposition that when one or more things of
a class are expressly mentioned others of the same class are excluded)).
148
United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294 (2008) (narrowing the range of permissible means by
use of “the commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis—which counsels that a word is given more precise content
by the neighboring words with which it is associated”).
149
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 562 U.S. 277, 294 (2011) (defining the canon of ejusdem
generis, “which limits general terms [that] follow specific ones to matters similar to those specified” (alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
150
Kolon Indus. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 748 F.3d 160, 180 n.2 (4th Cir. 2014) (Shedd, J.,
dissenting) (“The absurdity canon allows courts to disregard the statutory text when adhering to the text ‘would
result in a disposition that no reasonable person could approve’.” (marks in original) (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA
& BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 234 (2012))).
151
United States v. Kerley, 416 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Under the last antecedent rule, a limiting
clause or phrase should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
152
United States v. Laraneta, 700 F.3d 983, 989 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he series-qualifier canon, contradicts
the last-antecedent canon; it provides that a modifier at the beginning or end of a series of terms modifies all the
terms.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 235 (2013).
142
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the familiar contextual canons, such as the prefatory materials,153 in pari
materia,154 and general/specific155 canons, the presumption of consistent
usage,156 and the rule against redundancy,157 so important in the most anodyne
exercises of statutory construction.158
Broadly viewed, this multipart exegesis focuses on the relevant phrase’s
standard denotation and connotation, the relevant text’s grammatical structure,
comparison with similar terms used throughout the particular treaty, and the
instrument’s more general context, including any evidence of intent such as its
known and obvious purposes.159 To the extent a treaty’s language is plain and
unambiguous, distinct if often amalgamated facets,160 as ascertained by use of

153
Wiggins Bros., Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 667 F.2d 77, 88 (Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. 1981) (“In the
construction of the Constitution of the United States, statutes and regulations, the federal rule permits and
requires consideration of preambles in appropriate cases.”).
154
Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. State Superintendent of Educ., 746 F.3d 1135, 1158 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that,
as a general rule, statutes in pari materia should be construed together to ascertain the meaning and intent of
each).
155
RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) (“The general/specific
canon is perhaps most frequently applied to statutes in which a general permission or prohibition is contradicted
by a specific prohibition or permission. To eliminate the contradiction, the specific provision is construed as an
exception to the general one.”).
156
United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1417 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (defining the
presumption as “the rule of thumb that a term generally means the same thing each time it is used”).
157
Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 423 F.3d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[S]tatutes should be
construed to avoid holding language to be redundant.”).
158
Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 709 (1998).
159
Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 10, 20 (2010) (consulting the “text and structure” of the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction to define the phrase “righ[t] of custody” and
further reinforcing its interpretation based on this treaty’s “objects and purposes”); see also Maximov v. United
States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963) (“[I]t is particularly inappropriate for a court to sanction a deviation from the
clear import of a solemn treaty between this Nation and a foreign sovereign, when, as here, there is no indication
that application of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with
the intent or expectations of its signatories.”); Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1292 (9th Cir. 2003) (“This
Court’s duty to give effect, where possible, to every word of a treaty . . . should make us reluctant to deem treaty
terms, or terms used in other important international agreements, as surplusage.” (internal citation omitted)). The
Court has defended the use of a “uniform, text-based approach” as critical to “ensur[ing] international
consistency in interpreting the Convention.” Abbott, 560 U.S. at 12.
160
See Stern v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc. (In re Asher), 488 B.R. 58, 64–65 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2013) (exploring the connection and distinction); Shachmurove, Claims, supra note 46, at 528–31 (same).
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these motley rules of thumb,161 courts have no power to amend,162 harshness and
unreason (short of patent absurdity) be damned.163
Nonetheless, because treaties are different than the typical federal statute in
origination and purpose, representing both “the law of this land” and “an
agreement among sovereign powers,”164 otherwise atypical sources of
interpretive guidance may be used to dispel ambiguity and to select the perfectly
apposite plain and unambiguous import of a particular provision. Indeed, “courts
[may] look to [such] extrinsic sources to aid in the interpretation of a treaty even
with a relatively low level of ambiguity.”165 These interpretive aids include: (1)
“the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty,”166 (2) “the post[-]ratification
understanding of signatory nations,”167 (3) the reasonable view of a provision’s
meaning espoused by the executive branch agencies charged with the treaty’s
negotiation and/or enforcement,168 (4) the interpretations of other nations’

161
See, e.g., Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 381 (2013); Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.
249, 253–54 (1992).
162
Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989); see also The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat. 1,
71 (1821) (“[T]o alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by inserting any clause, whether small or great, important or
trivial, would be on our part an usurpation of power, and not an exercise of judicial functions.”).
163
See, e.g., Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005); Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 398
(1984); Edwards v. Valero Refining-Merauc, LLC, No. 3:14-CV-00772-JWD-EWD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9898, at *14 (M.D. La. Jan. 28, 2016).
164
Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996).
165
Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d 858, 878 (9th Cir. 2010) (Otero, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 3874 (2011).
166
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 507 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (relying on Zicherman
v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996)); see also, e.g., Bishop v. Reno, 210 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th
Cir. 2000) (“In construing treaties, we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the
negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988))), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 897 (2000).
167
Medellin, 552 U.S. at 507 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui
Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1996) (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985) (finding “the
opinions of our sister signatories to be entitled to considerable weight”)); see also Schroeder v. Lufthansa
German Airlines, 875 F.2d 613, 618 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[I]t is well established that treaty interpretation involves
a consideration of legislative history and the intent of the contracting parties.”) (quoting Maugnie v. Compagnie
Nat’l France, 549 F. 2d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1977).
168
Sumitomo Shoji Am. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 (1982) (relying on Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366
U.S. 187, 194 (1961) (“While courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by the departments
of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight.”)); see also,
e.g., McKesson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F.3d 485, 491 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Sumitomo, 457 U.S.
176 at 184–85, and giving “great weight to the fact that the United States shares” a particular view regarding a
treaty’s meaning).
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courts,169 and (5) scholarly commentaries.170 Beyond these sources, the so-called
“rule of equality” prohibits implementing statutory law that renders any treaty
term nugatory.171 Hence, for most treaties, while a court must begin “with the[ir]
text . . . and the context in which the written words are used,”172 a more liberal
interpretive scheme than the one applicable to statutes controls.173
B. CISG’s Domestic Status
1. Preeminence
With trade having “always been an incentive for harmoni[z]ing or unifying
law,”174 CISG represents the culmination of decades of labor.175 This stunningly
successful treaty sought to “contribute to the removal of legal barriers in . . . and
promote the development of international trade”176 and has been described as
“arguably the greatest legislative achievement aimed at harmonizing the
international law of sales,”177 enjoying “widespread acceptance as the governing
law of contracts for international trade.”178 A self-executing treaty179 that creates
169
Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 537 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226–28 (1996)).
170
Roser Technologies, Inc. v. Carl Schreiber GmbH, No. 11cv302 ERIE, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129242,
at *13–14 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2013) (relying in part on United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669
(1992)).
171
Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1803), amended on other grounds, 265 U.S. 332.
172
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988) (quoting Societe Nationale
Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 534 (1987)).
173
Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205, 216 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534 (1991)).
174
Schwenzer et al., supra note 126, at 427.
175
See, e.g., H. Allen Blair, Hard Cases under the Convention on the International Sale of Goods: A
Proposed Taxonomy of Interpretive Challenges, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 269, 275 (2011); Christopher
Sheaffer, The Failure of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and a
Proposal for a New Uniform Global Code in International Sales Law, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 461,
469 (2007).
176
CISG pmbl., art. I(1)(a); Honey Holdings I, Ltd. v. Alfred L. Wolff, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 3d 543, 551 (S.D.
Tex. 2015) (quoting id.).
177
David Frisch, Commercial Common Law, the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of
Goods, and the Inertia of Habit, 74 TUL. L. REV. 495, 501 (1999); see also Marcia J. Staff, United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Lessons Learned from Five Years of Cases, 6 S.C.
J. INT’L L & BUS. 1, 3 (2009) (describing CISG as “one of the most successful international conventions
promulgated by the United Nations”).
178
Jeffrey R. Hartwig, Note, Schmitz-Werke GMBH & Co. v. Rockland Industries, Inc. and the United
Nations Convention on Contractions for the International Sale of Goods (CISG): Diffidence and Developing
International Legal Norms, 22 J. L. & COM. 77, 98 (2003).
179
VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co., Nos. 13–1799, 13–1697, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS,
6692, at *18 (7th Cir. Apr. 10, 2014) (quoting Chi. Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408 F.3d
894, 897 (7th Cir. 2005) (describing CISG as “a self-executing agreement between the United States and other
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a private right of action in all federal courts,180 an understanding at least partly
based on CISG’s legislative history and its commercial subject-matter,181 any
action based on a CISG provision squarely falls within the federal courts’ subject
matter jurisdiction.182 Pursuant to Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, moreover,
any properly enacted treaty constitutes “the supreme Law of the Land . . . any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding,”183 so that CISG is as much a part of every state’s law as the
Constitution itself.184 In light of these facts, if CISG does indeed apply to a
signatories”)); Beth Schiffer Fine Photographic Arts, Inc. v. Colex Imaging, Inc., No. Civ. No. 10-05321, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36695, at *18–19 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2012) (“The CISG is a self-executing treaty that preempts
contrary provisions of article 2 of the UCC and other state contract law to the extent that those causes of action
fall within the scope of the CISG.”); Delchi Carrier v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027–28 (2d Cir. 1995)
(affirming district court decision that treated CISG as self-executing); cf, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491,
505 n.2 (2008) (“What we mean by ‘self-executing’ is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal
law upon ratification.”); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933) (“For in a strict sense the [t]reaty was
self-executing, in that no legislation was necessary to authorize executive action pursuant to its provisions.”);
see also, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892,
922, 959, 989 (2004); James E. Bailey, Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law of International Sales, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
273, 281, 304 (1999). If it was not self-executing, CISG would lack domestic effect in the absence of
implementing legislation. At least some scholars have theorized that this fact explains United States courts’
haphazard treatment of CISG. Kina Grbic, Putting the CISG Where it Belongs: In the Uniform Commercial
Code, 29 TOURO L. REV. 173, 191 (2012).
180
Genpharm Inc. v. Pliva-Lachema a.s., 361 F. Supp. 2d 49, 53–54 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), cited in ProfiParkiet Sp. Zoo v. Seneca Hardwoods LLC, No. 13 CV 4358(PKC)(LB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71289, at *8
(E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2014).
181
Asante Techs., Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1150–52 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Bailey,
supra note 179, at 281.
182
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (2014); see, e.g., ECEM Europa Chem. Mktg. B.V. v. Purolite Co., 451 F. App’x
73, 79 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[I]f . . . the CISG (an international treaty) governs the dispute, then we may treat the
dispute as a federal question.”); Genpharm Inc. v. Pliva-Lachema, 361 F. Supp. 2d 49, 53–54 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(concluding CISG applied and federal subject matter jurisdiction therefore existed over an action for breach of
contract); BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333, 336–37 (5th Cir. 2003)
(concluding that per § 1331(a) “CISG . . . creates a private right of action in federal court”). This fact has led
one judge to discount the potential difficulties of interpreting and applying CISG specifically. Taub v. Marchesi
Di Barolo S.P.A., No. 09-CV-599 (ADS)(ETB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115565, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10,
2009) (Spatt, J.); Genpharm Inc. v. Pliva-Lachema a.s., 361 F. Supp. 2d 49, 53-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (Spatt, J.).
Of course, as this jurisdictional grant does not appear to be exclusive but rather concurrent, no constitutional
stricture necessarily forecloses state courts from ruling on CISG. Alstine, supra note 158, at 690 & n.13.
183
U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2; Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2472–73 (2013); JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1832 (1833) (“In regard to treaties, there is equal reason, why
they should be held, when made, to be the supreme law of the land. . . . [T]reaties constitute solemn compacts
of binding obligation among nations . . . . [T]hey ought to have a positive binding efficacy as laws upon all the
states, and all the citizens of the states.”).
184
Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 490 (1880); accord Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331,
346 (2006) (“is well established that a self-executing treaty binds the States pursuant to the Supremacy Clause,
and that the States therefore must recognize the force of the treaty in the course of adjudicating the rights of
litigants.”); Filanto S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1237 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (emphasizing
that CISG, like the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, is “state law”);
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prepetition contract between two or more parties, one of whom later assumes a
debtor’s mantle, its provisions automatically preempt any contrary state law
such as the UCC185 or any federal statute enacted prior to its effective date of
January 1, 1988.186 Only to the Constitution187 and a later federal law188 can
CISG be inferior.189 Despite U.S. courts’ seeming reluctance to invoke it,190

see also, e.g., Alstine, supra note 179, at 901, 920; Sunil R. Harjani, The Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods in United States Courts, 23 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 49, 53 (2000); Arthur Rosett, Critical
Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 45 OHIO ST.
L.J. 265, 301 (1984). Thus, CISG can never be deemed “foreign law” that must be raised in accordance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1, FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1, though one appellate court strangely concluded
otherwise in 1996, Attorneys Trust v. Videotape Computer Prods., 94 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished
disposition).
185
U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2; Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 237 (1796) (“It is the declared will of the people
of the United States that every treaty made, by the authority of the United States, shall be superior to the
Constitution and laws of any individual State.”); see also, e.g., It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim Hotelgesellschaft
mbH, No. 11-CV-2379, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107149, at *46–47 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2013) (holding that, if
CISG controlled, Pennsylvania law was fully preempted); Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Seachem, No. H-07-2950,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7288, at *12–13 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 2013) (reaching the same conclusion as to plaintiff’s
state law contract claims); BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333, 336 (5th
Cir. 2003) (holding that CISG creates a private right of action in federal court); Valero Mktg. & Supply Co. v.
Greeni Oy, 373 F. Supp. 2d 475, 480 n.7 (D.N.J. 2005) (noting that the CISG preempts state contract law to the
extent that state causes of action fall within the scope of the CISG); Usinor Industeel v. Leeco Steel Prods., Inc.,
209 F. Supp. 2d 880, 884 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that under the Supremacy Clause, the CISG would displace
any contrary state sales law such as the UCC’s article 2).
186
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194, (1888) (“By the constitution, a treaty is placed on the same
footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. . . . [I]f the two are inconsistent, the one last in
date will control the other, provided always the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing.”); accord
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (plurality opinion)).
The Senate ratified CISG on October 9, 1986, setting an effective date of January 1, 1988, and the United States
deposited its ratification at the United Nations on December 11, 1986. Bailey, supra note 179, at 279.
187
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957); see also, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988); Alstine,
supra note 179, at 950. Whether the Constitution places limited on federalism in the course of implementing a
legal treaty via statute remains an open question, left unresolved by the most recent Court case within this
particular field.
188
Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194, cited in Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419, 426–27 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing
id. for “the last in time rule that, if a statute and treaty are inconsistent, then the last in time will prevail”), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1135 (2000); see also Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 724 F.3d
230, 233–34 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (reiterating the rule).
189
Bailey, supra note 179, at 284. In all other cases, “CISG automatically applies to international sales
contracts between parties from different contracting states unless the parties agree to exclude [its] application.”
Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc. v. Dongbu Hannong Chem. Co., Ltd., No. 06 Civ. 3972 (LTS)(JCF), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 110716, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Zhejiang Shaoxing Yongli Printing & Dyeing Co., Ltd. v. Microflock Textile Grp. Corp., No. 06-CV22608(JJO), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40418 (S.D. Fla. May 19, 2008)). Consequently, in the case of a true and
irresolvable conflict between the earlier adopted Code and later ratified CISG, the Code would have to give.
190
Shani Salama, Pragmatic Responses to Interpretive Impediments: Article 7 of the CISG, an InterAmerican Application, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 225, 231 (2006–07).
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CISG’s coverage is seen as far-reaching,191 its every article imbued with the full
“preemptive force of federal law.”192
2. Caveats about Utility of Domestic Case Law in CISG Cases
Prior to any attempted construction of a CISG article by court or
commentator, four sematic signs must be minded.
First, the Court’s approach to treaty exposition does not necessarily cohere
with scholars’ understanding of CISG’s interpretive template. In fact, as to
treaties like CISG that regulate conduct between private entities and implicate
no foreign policy or sovereignty concerns, there may be “no reason,” as the
Court has done,193 “to give controlling deference to the intent of the contracting
parties or the views of the Executive Branch in interpreting . . . [their]
substantive provisions.”194 Nonetheless, binding precedent leaves no room for
the utilization of other theories, and any objection, however valid it may seem,
cannot be sustained unless the Court itself interposes a newer and more apt
model. In addition, despite scholarly insistence to the contrary,195 the Court’s
tiered approach—plain text, then structure, then purpose as evidenced by a
panoply of sources196—and its utilization of a wide array of sources appears to
conform to the interpretive scheme established in CISG’s seventh article.197 In
191
It’s Intoxicating, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107149, at *47; see also MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc.
v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, S.p.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Despite the CISG’s broad scope,
surprisingly few cases have applied the Convention in the United States.” (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 526
U.S. 1087 (1999).
192
Am. Mint LLC v. GOSoftware, No. 05–CV–650, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45003, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Aug.
16, 2005); accord, e.g., Stawski Distrib. Co. v. Zywiec Breweries PLC, No. 02 C 8708, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17676, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2003); Usinor Industeel v. Leeco Steel Prods., Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 880, 884
(N.D. Ill. 2002).
193
See supra Part IV.A.
194
Alstine, supra note 158, at 708; Grbic, supra note 179, at 192 n.132. CISG’s article 7, for one, “rejects
the restrictive approach that is evidence in much of the recent Supreme Court treaty jurisprudence.” Alstine,
supra note 158, at 757.
195
Franco Ferrari, Applying the CISG in a Truly Uniform Manner: Tribunale di Vigevano (Italy), 12 July
2000, NS Vol. 6, Uniform Law Review / Revue de Droit Uniforme, 203, 205–06 (2001).
196
Alstine, supra note 179, at 982; Franco Ferrari, Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 Uniform Sales Law,
24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 183, 207 (1994).
197
E.g., Camilla Baasch Andersen, The Uniform International Sales Law and the Global
Jurisconsultorium, 24 J. L. & COM. 159, 165 (2005); Bailey, supra note 179, at 297; Alstine, supra note 158, at
753; Franco Ferrari, The Relationship Between the UCC and the CISG and the Construction of Uniform Law,
29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1027 (1996) see also Harjani, supra note 184, at 61 (enumerating seven sources in
descending importance: “(1) general principles of contract law contained in the CISG; (2) the legislative history
of the CISG; (3) case law from foreign jurisdictions interpreting the Convention; (4) treatises and commentary
of noted scholars on the CISG; (5) general principles of private international law; (6) case law from domestic
jurisdictions interpreting the Convention; and (7) case law from domestic jurisdictions interpreting domestic
sales law”). Consideration of each source therein identified is perfectly customary as a matter of domestic treaty
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effect, then, any U.S. judge who interprets CISG pursuant to the Court’s
dominant model will often find itself acting consistently with CISG’s
unambiguous directives,198 if not necessarily with the kind of utmost regard for
its implicit and contestable interpretive exhortations demanded by many
international law experts.199
Second, a problem rooted in common law systems’ preference for decisions
based on precedent200 may also stymie any judicial interpreter. Within the
domestic arena, CISG’s already “vague” and “relatively abstract”
phraseology201 has led to the emergence of an oft-disparaged “homeward trend”
in certain nations.202 Influenced by this potent predilection, federal and state
courts throughout the United States continue to rely on UCC case law, assert the
virtual absence of CISG case law, and exhibit an almost complete disregard for
CISG cases decided by foreign courts.203 Consequently, as “a majority of courts
[have] look[ed] across federal jurisdictions for guidance in dealing with cases of
first impression,”204 initial errata have often been duplicated, with the United
States decried as one of the “leading countries in misapplications of the
Convention’s provisions.”205 This fact should not be overlooked when CISG’s

interpretation. And it is by no means clear that CISG requires such a ranking. See Bailey, supra note 179, at
293–94 (“[W]hile the Convention’s requirement that decisions from other jurisdictions be considered is clear,
just how much significance a court should attach to those decisions is.”).
198
See Sheaffer, supra note 175, at 487–88. In practice, U.S. courts have often strayed.
199
Ferrari, supra note 197, at 1033. Whether bankruptcy’s oddities may yet allow for the harmonization
of these discordant strands is an interesting question worthy of further exploration, but beyond this Article’s
purview.
200
William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and Unmodified), 60 LA. L.
REV. 677, 701 (1999–2000) (“A major difference between the civil law and common law is that priority in civil
law is given to doctrine (including the codifiers’ reports) over jurisprudence, while the opposite is true in the
common law.”). In part, CISG’s drafters hoped to “harmoniz[e] civil and common law jurisprudence.” Sarah
Howard Jenkins, Construing the Laws Governing International and U.S. Domestic Contracts for the Sale of
Goods: A Comparative Evaluation of the CISG and the UCC, 26 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 181, 183 (2012);
accord Camilla Andersen, The Global Jurisconsultorium of the CISG Revisited, 13 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM.
L. & ARB. 43, 45 (2009).
201
Larry A. DiMatteo et al., The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen
Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 299, 311 (2004).
202
Salama, supra note 190, at 250.
203
Staff, supra note 177, at 15.
204
Michael F. Sturley, The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods: Will a Homeward Trend Emerge?, 21 TEX. INT’L L.J. 540, 542 (1986); see also, e.g., Marlyse McQuillen,
Note, The Development of a Federal CISG Common Law in U.S. Courts: Patterns of Interpretation and Citation,
61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 509, 511 (2006); Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Interpretive Challenge to Uniformity, 15
J.L. & COM. 175, 176 (1995).
205
Sheaffer, supra note 175, at 477; accord Bailey, supra note 179, at 275 (“Despite the CISG’s political
and economic significance to the United States, for the past decade, U.S. courts and attorneys have overlooked,
misconstrued, and misapplied the terms of the Convention.”). Other, less charged reasons may explain this
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domestic precedent is perused for aid in the explication of a specific CISG
provision, for the likelihood of an original error is greater than in normal cases
of a purely domestic law’s interpretation.
Third, encomia aside,206 CISG’s flaws as a document and a body of law are
legion.207 Honestly explicated, CISG’s articles provide only “very general,
vague default rules tied to the concept of reasonableness”;208 consequently, its
methodology of interpretation is itself ambiguous.209 The lack of any official
commentary or any comment within CISG itself about the “role, if any,
contemplated for authoritative judicial interpretation,”210 interjects further doubt
about the rightful weight of any precedent, whether foreign or domestic,
scholars’ complaints notwithstanding. Just as significantly, certain terms, from
the prosaic, such as article 3’s definition of “goods,” to the more hortatory, such
as article 7’s “general principles” and “international character,” are not welldefined.211
In fact, so many principles critical for the delineation of parties’ duties—
“fundamental breach,” “reasonable time,” and “good faith,” among the most
significant—are expressly espoused but ambiguously delineated, CISG’s
interpretation an often “daunting” task.212 Compounding the problem, although
CISG mandates the employment of general principles in unclear cases, it
specifies “very few principles,” making it a “poor guide for those faced with the
concrete task of giving meaning to the words.”213 These noted details cannot but
compel an assiduous attention to CISG’s precise and ratified text, thereby
obviating the need to rely on an often incoherent international jurisprudence,214
except as to those ambiguous articles upon which a decided juridical and
scholarly consensus has settled. As such, for all the vociferous disparagement of
apparent pattern, including CISG “relative newness” and the “lack of utilization . . . by contracting parties.”
Lopez, supra note 117, at 155.
206
JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN THE USA: A COMPACT GUIDE TO THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 1 (2d ed. 2004).
207
See Susan J. Martin-Davidson, Selling Goods Internationally: Scope of the U.N. Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 17 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 657, 660–61 (2008) (enumerating
four of the more prominent weaknesses).
208
DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 320.
209
Sheaffer, supra note 175, at 487–495.
210
Rosett, supra note 184, at 297.
211
See Bailey, supra note 179, at 287, 291, 309.
212
Blair, supra note 175, at 313–14; Bailey, supra note 179, at 295.
213
Rosett, supra note 184, at 299.
214
Cf. Salama, supra note 190, at 250 (noting that article 7(2)’s prominent shortcomings include “the
absence of a common and comprehensive understanding of the meaning of ‘general principles’”); Hartnell, supra
note 17, at 7 (describing article 4(a)’s validity exception as “a particular danger to the development of a coherent
jurisprudence of international trade”).
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American courts’ parochial penchants, the only form of CISG interpretation that
is both reasonable and defensible in light of such international disagreement over
issues large and small corresponds strikingly well with American precedent.215
Lastly, the real state of CISG case law within the domestic arena is
debatable. To this day, U.S. tribunals repeat the old saw that “[t]here is little case
law interpreting the CISG.”216 This assertion, however, is of dubious validity,
not only due to the existence of much foreign CISG case law,217 opinions worthy
of a U.S. court’s cogitation,218 but also due to the fact that numerous domestic
decisions have been issued in the last two decades.219 Nonetheless, many of these
rulings are not published in the federal courts’ official reporters, rendering them
bereft of conclusive and decisive precedential weight.220 Equally telling, less
than a handful of bankruptcy opinions have extensively cited and rigorously
applied CISG’s substantive provisions to a creditor’s claim.221 Indeed, one of
the more famous bankruptcy-related cases, Helen Kaminski Pty. Ltd. v.
Marketing Australians Products Inc.,222 has elicited withering and justified
criticism.223

215
But see Monica Kilian, CISG and the Problem with Common Law Jurisdictions, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L L.
& POL’Y 217, 227–30 (2000) (collecting authorities).
216
Rienzi & Sons, Inc. v. N. Puglisi & F. Industria Paste Alimentari S.P.A., No. 08-CV-2540 (DLI)
(JMA), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41478, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2014); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393
F. Supp. 2d 659, 673 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Usinor Industeel v. Leeco Steel Prods., Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 880, 884
(N.D. Ill. 2002).
217
Francesco G. Mazzotta, Why Do Some American Courts Fail to Get it Right?, 3 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L.
REV. 85, 95 (2005).
218
See supra Part IV.A.
219
Staff, supra note 203, at 14; McQuillen, supra note 204, at 511.
220
See Johanna S. Schiavoni, Who’s Afraid of Precedent?: The Debate Over the Precedential Value of
Unpublished Opinions, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1860–77 (2002) (discussing the debate amongst the courts
regarding the value of unpublished opinions).
221
E.g., In re World Imps., Ltd., 511 B.R. 738 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2014); In re Siskiyou Evergreens, Inc.,
No. 02-66975-fra11, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1044 (D. Or. Mar. 29, 2014). A few others engage in no substantial
analysis. E.g., In re Access Cardiosystems, Inc., 361 B.R. 626, 641 n.19 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (quoting the
relevant contact’s exclusionary clause); Ayers Aviation Holdings, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Ga. (In re Ayers
Aviation Holdings, Inc.), No. 00-11881, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1151, at *2 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. July 25, 2002) (noting
that CISG’s second article excludes aircraft); Victoria Alloys, Inc. v. Fortis Bank SA/NV (In re Victoria Alloys,
Inc.), 261 B.R. 424, 431 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (observing that both CISG and the UCC “require payment per
the contract’s terms”).
222
See generally Helen Kaminski PTY Ltd. v. Marketing Australian Prods., No. M-47 (DLC), 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10630 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 1997) (denying appellant’s motion for leave to appeal the bankruptcy
court’s interlocutory order holding that CISG did not apply to a distributorship agreement).
223
Kilian, supra note 215, at 227 n.47; Victoria M. Genys, Note, Blazing a Trail in the “New Frontier”
of the CISG: Helen Kaminski Pty. Ltd. v. Marketing Australian Products, Inc., 17 J. L. & COM. 415, 419 (1997).

SHACHMUROVE GALLEYPROOFS

2018]

CISG AS THE MEASURE OF A CLAIM’S VALUE

6/14/2018 3:41 PM

493

C. Defining CISG’s Boundaries
1. Jurisdictional Requirements
CISG contains a “comprehensive set of rules governing the formation,
performance, and remedies for breach of contracts within its jurisdictional
scope.”224 It thus preempts contrary state laws only to the extent those statutory
or common law rules impinge upon this specialized ambit: “the formation of the
contract of sale and the right and obligations of the seller and buyer that arise
from such a contract.”225 Once this jurisdictional standard is untangled into its
components, the five legal elements that need to be established for CISG to
govern a transaction can be succinctly stated: (1) the existence of “a contract for
a sale;” (2) the sale concerns “goods;” (3) the parties’ “place[s] of business” or
“habitual residence” are in different contracting states;226 (4) the plaintiff and
defendant are the immediate buyer or the immediate seller;227 and (5) the parties
have not expressly excluded CISG’s application in the relevant contract. Either
explicitly stated or implicit in its text, these five elements are CISG’s threshold
prerequisites. If even one is absent, CISG will not apply. Conversely, if all
characterize the relevant transaction, CISG’s reach is absolute as a matter of
valid and binding federal law,228 solicitude for any material differences from the
UCC’s common variants of utmost significance,229 as the choice may often
prove to be outcome determinative.230
The first two of these essential prerequisites are relatively easy to ascertain.
A “contract of sale” is defined in articles 30 through 52 as a contract pursuant to
which one party (the seller) is bound to deliver the goods and transfers the
property in the goods sold and the other party (the buyer) is obligated to pay the
224
Frisch, supra note 177, at 503; accord Grbic, supra note 179, at 175 (describing it as an “independent
body of law”).
225
CISG arts. 1(1)(a), 4; accord, e.g., Usinor Industeel v. Leeco Steel Prods., Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 880,
885 (N.D. Ill. 2002). Axiomatically, of course, contracts negotiated by an agent of the buyer or the seller would
bind either party. See TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, No. 00 Civ. 5189 (RCC), 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5546, at *8–12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2002) (refusing to dismiss a complaint when complaint plausible
alleged that the third party was but an agent).
226
CISG art. 1(1)(a). The third requirement is due to a reservation made by the United States, as permitted
by article 95, prohibiting the application of section 1(b) of article 1 to sales between U.S. entities and business
based in non-contracting states.
227
Martini E. Ricci Iamino S.P.A. v. Consortile Societa Agricola, No. 1:13-CF-276 AWI SAB, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 90604, at *35 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2014).
228
Chateau Des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabate USA Inc., 328 F.3d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1049 (2003).
229
Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995).
230
See, e.g., Barbara Berry, S.A. de C.V. v. Ken M. Spooner Farms, Inc., 254 F. App’x 646, 647 (9th Cir.
2007); Frisch, supra note 177, at 505.
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price and accept the goods.231 Unfortunately, CISG provides no concrete
definition for the second, but its second article does explicitly exclude from its
coverage the sales of six categories of “goods”: (a) “goods bought for personal,
family or household use, unless the seller, at any time before or at the conclusion
of the contract, neither knew nor ought to have known that the goods were
bought for any such use;” (b) “by auction;” (c) “on execution or otherwise by
authority of law;” (d) “of stocks, shares, investment securities, negotiable
instruments or money;” (e) “of ships, vessels, hovercraft or aircraft;” and (f) “of
electricity.”232 These exclusions appear based on the purpose of the goods’
acquisition as ascertained at the time of purchase (article 2(a)), the type of sales
contract involved (article 2(b) and (c)), or on the kind of goods sold (article 2(d),
(e), (f)),233 CISG exempting goods bought for purely personal and noncommercial use234 but covering contracts where seller is obliged to provide
services and labor in addition to a commercial product235 or where goods are
manufactured or produced by a seller without the buyer supplying “a substantial
part of the materials necessary for such manufacture or production.”236
CISG’s tenth article helps clarify the third prong. That article declares:
“[T]he closest relationship theory” is to be employed in determining whether the
parties “place[s] of business” is in a contracting state.237 As “a general rule,” the
place of business is regarded as where “the center of the business activity
directed to the participation is located.”238 As a textual matter, “[n]either the
nationality of the parties nor the civil or commercial character of the parties or
of the contract” matters.239 Instead, a contract’s internationality depends upon
the parties having their places of business (or habitual residences) in different

231

CISG arts. 30–52.
CISG art. 2(a)–(f); cf. Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 286
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (liming CISG’s scope); Frisch, supra note 177, at 504 (“[D]espite some similarities, the CISG
does not necessarily resemble current article 2 [of the UCC] in either scope or substance.”).
233
Franco Ferrari, Specific Topics of the CISG in the Light of Judicial Application and Scholarly Writing,
15 J.L. & COM. 1, 69, 73 (1995).
234
Michael Kabik, Through the Looking-Glass: International Trade in the “Wonderland” of the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 9 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 408, 411 (1992).
235
Ferrari, supra note 233, at 61–62. The “preponderant part of the obligations” of the seller, however,
cannot consist of “the supply of labor or other services.” CISG art. 3(2) (emphasis added).
236
CISG art. 3; Genphram Inc. v. Pliva-Lachema a.s., 361 F. Supp. 2d 49, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
237
CISG art. 10(a)–(b); VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co., 748 F.3d 780, 787 (7th Cir.
2013).
238
Ferrari, supra note 233, at 26–27.
239
CISG art. 1(3); Frank N. Fisanich, Note & Comment, Application of the U.N. Sales Convention in
Chinese International Commercial Arbitration: Implications for International Uniformity, 10 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 101, 106 n.32 (1999).
232
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contracting states,240 unless this fact would be impossible to discern from the
contract itself or the parties’ prior dealings.241
The fourth and fifth requirements have been consistently limned in case law.
The fourth—that the parties be the transaction’s “immediate” participants, not
“remote” purchasers or sellers—has been consistently imputed into CISG’s
fourth article, which refers solely to buyers and sellers.242 As for the fifth,
whereas, in accordance with article 6, CISG cannot apply if the parties expressly
opted out of CISG,243 courts appear unwilling “to recognize implied agreements
which exclude application of the convention.”244 Indeed, with one exception,245
the understanding that contractual opt-outs must explicitly exclude CISG’s
application to be effective is one of the few unmistakably endorsed by U.S. and
foreign courts.246
2. Explicit and Implicit Omissions from CISG’s Scope
While CISG governs all issues dealing with the relevant contract’s formation
and the rights and obligations of the seller and buyer arising from the covered
contract, the areas beyond its purview are equally apparent. Domestic law still
dictates “the validity of the contract or of any of its provision or of any usage”
and “the effect which the contract may have on the property in the goods
sold.”247 Accordingly, “those points of domestic law which express a country’s
240

Ferrari, supra note 233, at 23–24, 25.
CISG art. 1(2); Impuls I.D. Internacional, S.L. v. Psion-Teklogix Inc., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1271
(S.D. Fla. 2002).
242
CISG art. 4 (“This Convention governs only the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and
obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract.” (emphasis added)); Beth Schiffer Fine
Photographic Arts, Inc. v. Colex Imaging, Inc., No. 10-05321, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36695, *19 (D.N.J. Mar.
19, 2012) (collecting cases). Article 4 is nearly identical to article 1, the only difference being the addition of
“only” in the former. Compare CISG art. 4, with CISG art. 1(1).
243
CISG art. 6. For examples of such clauses, see, e.g., Kofax, Inc. v. United States, No. 11-449 C, 2013
U.S. Claims, LEXIS 1026, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Aug 8, 2013); Stella Maris, Inc. v. Cork Supply USA, Inc., No. 6:11cv-954-HO, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58497, at *7–8 (D. Or. Apr. 26, 2012); Belcher-Robinson, L.L.C. v. Linamar
Corp., 699 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1332 (M.D. Ala. 2010); Hawaiian Telcom Comm., Inc. v. Tata Am. Int’l Corp.,
No. 10-00112 HG-LEK, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63187, at *3 (D. Haw. May 24, 2010); In re Yahoo! Inc., 313
F. App’x 722, 722 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2009); Jacada
(Europe) Ltd. v Int’l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 744, 746 (W.D. Mich. 2003).
244
Isaak I. Dore & James E. DeFranco, A Comparison of the Non-Substantive Provisions of the
UNCITRAL Convention on the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 49, 53 (1982).
245
Am. Biophysics Corp. v. Dubois Marine Specialties, 411 F. Supp. 2d 61, 63–64 (D.R.I. 2006). Between
2003 and 2008, every other American court disagreed with this one opinion. Staff, supra note 203, at 28.
246
McQuillen, supra note 204, at 519–20.
247
CISG art. 4; see also Allied Dynamics Corp. v. Kennametal, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 2d 276, 298–99
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that CISG “governs the substantive question of contract formation” and collecting
241
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public policies”248—a class of doctrines clearly including fraud, mistake, duress,
unconscionability, and illegality;249 possibly encompassing initial impossibility
and apparent consent;250 and generally any provisions of domestic law that
would “render the contract void, voidable, or unenforceable”—may work their
influence untrammeled by CISG’s own.251 Logically, CISG will also not govern
tort claims distinct from a party’s contractual action.252 Article 5, in turn,
expressly removes actions and claims for personal injuries, including death,
from CISG’s umbrella.253 Additionally, many “[c]ourts interpreting the CISG
. . . have concluded that the law does not extend to agreements that create a
framework for the future sale of goods but fail to establish specific terms for
quantity and price.”254 This definition obviously excludes agreements, like
distribution ones, that relate to the future sale of goods and not “a particular sale
of goods” with “definite terms regarding quantity and price” enumerated.255
3. General Principles and Trade Usages as Interpretive Aids
Its reach so circumscribed, several of CISG’s provisions set forth the general
precepts intended to shepherd interpretation of an ambiguous provision.256 In
particular, during such a task, per article 7(1), “regard is to be had to its
cases); Golden Valley Grape Juice & Wine, LLC v. Centrisys Corp., No. CV F 09-1424 LJO GSA, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11884, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan 22, 2010) (“CISG governs only the formation of the contract of sale,
and the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract.”); Caterpillar, Inc. v.
Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659, 674 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (quoting CISG).
248
Ulrich Drobnig, Substantive Validity, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 635, 635 (1992).
249
Hartnell, supra note 17, at 62, 69, 71, 83; Rosett, supra note 184, at 291.
250
Hartnell, supra note 17, at 62, 69, 71.
251
Tellingly, these doctrines are themselves “subject to multiple interpretations by domestic jurisdictions
within the United States” and “lack of definite contours.” Lopez, supra note 205, at 14.
252
Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp., L.L.C., 718 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1024 (D. Minn.
2010); accord, e.g., Semi-Materials Co., Ltd. v. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc., No. 4:06CV1426 FRB, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1790, at *8 n.2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 2011); Viva Vino Imp. Corp. v. Farnese Vini S.r.l., No. 99-6384,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12347, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2000). Of course, as under domestic law, mere
nomenclature may not be dispositive, and “a tort that is in essence a contract claim and does not involve interests
existing independently of contractual obligations . . . will fall within the scope of CISG regardless of the label
given to the claim.” Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd., No. 4:09cv00318 SWW, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 120183, at *15–16 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009); accord Weihai Textile Grp. Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd. v. Level
8 Apparel, LLC, No. 11 Civ. 4405 (ALC)(FM), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53688, at *47 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014).
253
CISG art. 5; Peter Schlechtriem, Requirements of Application and Sphere of Applicability of the CISG,
36 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 781, 792 (2005).
254
Gruppo Essenziero Italiano, S.p.A. v. Aromi D’Italia, Inc., No. CCB-08-65, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82217, at *10 (D. Md. July 27, 2011); accord Multi-Juice, S.A. v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 02 Civ. 4635
(RPP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35928, at *21–22 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2006) (collecting sources).
255
Viva Vino Import Corp. v. Farnese Vini S.r.l., No. 99-6384, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12347, at *3–4,
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2000) (emphasis added).
256
If the provision is not in any way ambiguous, it would be improper to consult these principles despite
the apparently inclusive wording of article 7. See Part IV.A–B.
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international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application
and the observance of good faith in international trade.”257 Closely related,258
these separable concerns—“international character,” “uniformity in
application,” and “observance of good faith”—essentially authorize utilization
of foreign case law259 and a court’s detachment from its own existing legal
order.260 In essence, CISG’s plain text effectively compels resort to its own
“general principles,”261 as does its use of “simple, non-nation specific
language.”262 To interpret any CISG provision, a court must consider four
factors: (1) CISG’s “international character;” (2) “the need to promote
uniformity in its application” it embodies; (3) “the observance of good faith in
international trade” it encourages; and (4) the provision of “some degree of
certainty as to the principles of law that would govern potential disputes and
[the] remov[al of] the previous doubt regarding which party’s legal system might
otherwise apply” that it seeks to achieve263 by, among other features, its attempts
to reduce forum shopping and private international law’s salience.264
Promulgated in article 7(1), these principles cannot be marginalized.265

257
CISG art. 7(1); Genpharm Inc. v. Pliva-Lachema a.s., 361 F. Supp. 2d 49, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting
CISG art. 7(1)).
258
Jenkins, supra note 200, at 187, 189.
259
See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 200, at 184; Camilla Baasch Andersen, The Uniform International Sales
Law and the Global Jurisconsultorium, 24 J.L. & COM. 159, 165 (2005); James P. Quinn, The Interpretation
and Application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 9 INT’L
TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 221, 237, 239 (2004); Alstine, supra note 158, at 732; Ferrari, supra note 197, at 1027.
260
Alstine, supra note 158, at 761; accord, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 200, at 185; Ferrari, supra note 233,
at 10–11.
261
See Delchi Carrier Spa v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027–28 (2d Cir. 1995); Topp Paper Co., LLC
v. ETI Converting Equip., No. 12-21014-CIV-Rosenbaum/Seltzer, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141193, at *7 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 28, 2013).
262
St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Med. Sys. & Support GmbH, No. 00 Civ. 9344 (SHS), 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5096, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002).
263
CISG art. 7(1) (listing (1) through (3)); Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d
Cir. 1995) (same); MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova d’Agostino, S.P.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1391
(11th Cir. 1998) (enumerating (4), as stated in the President’s transmittal letter), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1087
(1999).
264
Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 398 (3d Cir. 2010). Generally, “private
international law” encompasses the area of jurisprudence that American courts “call ‘conflict of laws,’ dealing
with the application of varying domestic laws to disputes that have an interstate or international component.”
Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 227 (1996).
265
Bruno Zeller, The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) – A Leap
Forward Towards Unified International Sales Laws, 12 PACE INT’L L. REV. 79, 86, 105 (2000); Ferrari, supra
note 197, at 1023–24, 1026.
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Nevertheless, pursuant to article 7(2), implicitly triggered only if both the
plain text and article 7(1) do not divulge a single concrete answer,266 questions
concerning matters “not expressly settled in” yet still “governed” by CISG “are
to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in
the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue
of the rules of private international law.”267 Two problems immediately arise
from this command: first, the phrase “general principles” has been criticized as
inherently and impossibly vague,268 and second, CISG does not actually specify
a single “general principle[].”269
Despite this overwhelming paucity, based on the widely invoked model laws
and commentary published by the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law (“UNIDROIT”),270 the following “general principles” have earned
this vital classification: (1) both buyer and seller have an affirmative duty to
disclose material facts and communicate all material information;271 (2)
relatedly, a party may not contradict a statement on which the other party
relied;272 (3) subject to article 4’s validity exception,273 autonomous parties may
freely contract to whatever duties and obligations they believe necessary or
appropriate,274 and courts are bound to respect those clearly expressed
intentions;275 (4) courts should strive to preserve an apparent deal and ensure
each party receives the reasonably projected fruits of an open exchange;276 (5)
technicalities and formal requirements should not be enforced for their own
sake;277 (6) a non-breaching party should take reasonable efforts to mitigate any
damages278 and should cooperate with the other to fix any curable defect prior
266
See Alstine, supra note 158, at 729, 742. Others have more expansively contended: “CISG mandates
the use of general principles, both express and implied, found within its Articles.” DiMatteo et al., supra note
201, at 315.
267
CISG art. 7(2); Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 400 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting
id.).
268
Ferrari, supra note 196, at 211.
269
Alstine, supra note 158, at 959; see also Bailey, supra note 179, at 287.
270
Indeed, while CISG commentators have bemoaned about the absence of something akin to a
restatement, Hartwig, supra note 178, at 97, the UNIDROIT principles have been described as an international
restatement of contract law, see Joseph Lookofsky, The Limits of Commercial Contract Freedom: Under the
UNIDROIT ‘Restatement’ and Danish Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 48, 485–88 (1998).
271
Alstine, supra note 158, at 752; Rosett, supra note 184, at 290; Dore & DeFranco, supra note 244, at
63.
272
Salama, supra note 190, at 241; Alstine, supra note 158, at 752.
273
See supra Part IV.C.2.
274
Blair, supra note 175, at 286.
275
Quinn, supra note 259, at 229, 231.
276
Id. at 229; Harjani, supra note 184, at 64.
277
Sheaffer, supra note 175, at 473.
278
Alstine, supra note 158, at 752.
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to a deadline’s expiration or the good’s irreparable dilapidation;279 (7) if a truly
unforeseen impediments arose, reasonable contractual modifications ought to be
considered, even if not accepted;280 (8) full compensation should be ordered in
the event of a breach,281 but awards should be directed at “compensate[ing]
aggrieved parties” rather than “punish[ing] breaching parties”;282 and (9) unless
a party’s subjective state of mind has been made known to the other party, its
responsibilities under the contract must be determined in accordance with a
reasonable person standard,283 a term that itself appears more than thirty times
in the entire convention.284 Finally, although “CISG does not recognize as a
general obligation of the parties an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
in the performance and enforcement of contracts,”285 the possible inclusion of
such a standard invoking much disagreement during its drafting,286 the weight
of precedent has endorsed a tenth general tenet: (10) a duty of good faith,287 one
analogous to the UCC’s variant.288 Serving to reinforce CISG’s express
provisions, this good faith principle has been employed to punish “fraudulent
conduct, unfair conduct, and deliberate conduct contrary to the essential
purposes or terms of the agreement.”289
A source of guidance distinct from the foregoing is lodged in CISG’s ninth
article. Having induced much debate among CISG’s drafters,290 article 9
selectively incorporates internationally known and observed trade usages. Thus,
per article 9(1), “parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and
279

Rosett, supra note 184, at 290.
Id. at 290.
281
Alstine, supra note 158, at 752.
282
Quinn, supra note 259, at 229.
283
Alstine, supra note 158, at 751–52; Ferrari, supra note 196, at 225. Like its domestic counterpart, this
standard has been critiqued for being “defined differently by courts” and “particularly vague,” Sheaffer, supra
note 175, at 473 n.75.
284
DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 317.
285
Jenkins, supra note 200, at 193.
286
Rosett, supra note 184, at 289.
287
See, e.g., DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 319 (“Despite the confinement of the express duty of good
faith to CISG interpretation, courts and arbitral panels have implied a general duty of good faith to dealings
between contracting parties.”); Alstine, supra note 158, at 780–81 (“Scholarly analysis subsequent to the
adoption of the Convention, however, has led to an emerging consensus on a much more expansive role for good
faith. Whatever the drafters’ actual intent, this new consensus recognizes ‘good faith’ as one of the ‘general
principles’ of the Convention.”); Dore & DeFranco, supra note 244, at 61 (“Thus, the good faith provision in
the Convention appears to be a pervasive norm analogous to the good faith obligation of the U.C.C.”).
288
Dore & DeFranco, supra note 244, at 61.
289
Jenkins, supra note 200, at 193–94; see also Zeller, supra note 265, at 101 (“Good faith . . . covers . . .
the parties’ rights and obligations. Basically, it is a ‘general duty’ based on judicial interpretation of community
standards, reasonableness and fair play.”).
290
Leonardo Graffi, Remarks on Trade Usages and Business Practices in International Sales Law, 29 J.L.
& COM. 273, 275 (2011).
280
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by any practices which they have established between themselves,”291 and such
usages, subjectively understood, can “bind the parties either through express or
implied agreement,”292 with the party relying upon a particular usage bearing the
burden to prove its existence.293 If, however, the parties did not share a provable
subjective understanding, article 9(2) intones, “[t]he parties are considered . . .
to have impliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of
which the parties knew or ought to have known and which in international trade
is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type
involved in the particular trade concerned.”294 Because, based on this text, trade
usages must be both widely observed and widely known for them to bind parties
under article 9(2), so-called “incoterms,” a series of pre-defined commercial
terms published by the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”), have
become usages within the meaning of this second paragraph,295 a position
affirmed by several U.S. courts.296 Still, in accordance with article 9(1), when
comparing express contractual terms, a verifiable course of performance or
dealing normally trumps even such objectively demonstrable trade usages.297
IV. UNIFIED APPROACH: THE CODE AND THE CISG
Perhaps unsurprisingly,298 CISG and the UCC encode a number of similar
legal principles,299 leading more than one court to (too hastily) describe the
former as “an international analogue” to the latter’s second article.300 True, both
291
CISG art. 9(1); Riccitelli v. Elemar New Eng. Marble & Granite LLC, No. 3:08CV01783(DJS), 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95086, at *13 (D. Conn. Sept. 11, 2010).
292
Dore & DeFranco, supra note 244, at 57.
293
Graffi, supra note 290, at 281.
294
CISG art. 9(2); Kabik, supra note 234, at 417–18 (discussing article 9(2)).
295
E.g., Graffi, supra note 290, at 283–84; Staff, supra note 177, at 31–32; Ingeborg Schwenzer, The
Danger of Domestic Pre-Conceived Views with Respect to the Uniform Interpretation of the CISG: The Question
of Avoidance in the Case of Non-Conforming Goods and Documents, 36 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV.
795, 804 (2005).
296
BP Oil Int’l Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador (PetroExuador), 332 F.3d 333, 335, 337–38
(5th Cir. 2003); St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Siemens Med. Sys. Inc., No. 00 Civ. 9344 (SHS), 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5096, at *9–11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002); see also, e.g., Urica, Inc. v. Pharmaplast S.A.E., No. CV 1102476 MMM (RZx), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110015, at *10 n.50 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (citing BP Oil Int’l
Ltd., 332 F.3d at 335, and St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., ), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5096, at *9–11).
297
Dore & DeFranco, supra note 244, at 59.
298
See Magellan Int’l Corp. v. Salzgitter Handel GmbH, 76 F. Supp. 2d 919, 924 (N.D. Ill. 1999)
(describing the pleading requirements set forth in CISG and the UCC as what “common sense” would dictate as
a minimum in their absence).
299
E.g., Simar Shipping Ltd. v. Global Fishing, Inc., 540 F. App’x 565, 567 (9th Cir. 2013); Dingxi
Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp., L.L.C., 635 F.3d 1106, 1108 (8th Cir. 2011).
300
Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd., 635 F.3d at 1107; accord, e.g., Sierra Seed Internacional SA de CV v. Al
Harrison Co. Distribs., No. CIV 13-206 TUC LAB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92777, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 10,
2013); Chi. Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2005).
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CISG and the common law consider “a meeting of the minds on essential terms”
as the linchpin for “[a] valid contract,”301 and both demand the same elements
for a breach of contract action to be properly pled and later proved: formation,
performance, breach, and damages.302 Indeed, the common law and common
sense compel as much.303 For such reasons, in many cases, the relevant
provisions of CISG and the UCC will produce the same legal consequences in a
particular case.304 Yet, regardless of the courts’ frequent refrain,305 CISG’s
design and provisions, scholars have long observed, are predisposed towards a
contract’s establishment and damages’ assessment in the interest of facilitating
international trade. In essence, this penchant aligns with the logic presumed to
animate international commercial treaties. As the Court once incisively observed
regarding the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards,306 “concerns of international comity . . . and sensitivity to the
need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution
of disputes”307 may require enforcement of a parties’ accord without regard to
domestic law’s necessarily more “parochial concept[s].”308
In short, despite these the structural congruencies between these two distinct
bodies of contract law, as to the three traditional elements necessary to prevail
301
Simar Shipping Ltd., 540 F. App’x at 567 (alteration in original) (quoting with approval Simar Shipping
Ltd. v. Global Fishing, Inc., No. C09-1825-JCC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67076, at *7 (W.D. Wash. May 14,
2012)); compare CISG art. 14(1), with Merrin-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Gunderson Bros Eng’g Corp., 305
F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1962).
302
Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd., 635 F.3d at 1108 (quoting Magellan Int’l Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d at 924)
accord, e.g., Martini E Ricci Iamino S.P.A. – Consortile Societa Agricola v. Trinity Fuirt Sales Co., 30 F. Supp.
3d 954, 965 (E.D, Cal. 2014) (citing Dingxi Longhai Dairy, 635 F.3d at 1107; Chi. Prime Packers, Inc., 408 F.3d
at 898; and Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex, 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995)).
303
Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd., 635 F.3d at 1108.
304
Chi. Prime Packers, Inc., 408 F.3d at 898, cited in VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co.,
748 F.3d 780, 787 (7th Cir. 2014); accord, e.g., Martini E. Ricci Camino S.P.A. – Consortile Societa Agricola
v. Trinity Fruit Sales Co., No. 1:13-CV-276 AWI SAB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90604, at *17 (E.D. Cal. July 2,
2014); Hilaturas Miel, S.L. v. Republic of Iraq, 573 F. Supp. 2d 781, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
305
See, e.g., Hilaturas Miel, S.L., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 800; Chi. Prime Packers, Inc., 408 F.3d at 898; Delchi
Carrier SpA, 71 F.3d at 1028.
306
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
307
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985); see also Scherk
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974) (characterizing a forum-selection clause as “an almost
indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international
business transaction”).
308
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972); see also, e.g., Estate of Myhra v. Royal
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 2012). “We cannot,” Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
wrote in 1972, “have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms,
governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.” The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9; see also Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas)
Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting The Bremen after describing it as “not strictly an arbitration
case”).
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on a breach of contract claim—(1) “the existence of an enforceable contract;”
(2) “nonperformance amounting to a breach of contract;” and (3) “damage
caused by the breach of contract”309—CISG and the UCC delineate these
elements rather differently.310 Accordingly, assuming the jurisdictional
constraints set forth in articles 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 have been met and that no intent
to derogate from CISG sufficiently unequivocal to trigger article 6 can be
established, CISG will always impel a unique approach and, sometimes, an
unfamiliar result.
A. Existence of an Enforceable Contract
1. Summary of Relevant Articles
Under CISG (and the UCC, for that matter), the existence of an offer and the
communication of a valid acceptance are threshold elements for a contract to be
engendered.311 For a statement, whether written or oral, to constitute an offer,
the offeror must express an intention to be bound, and the proposal itself must
be definite by “indicat[ing] the goods and expressly or implicitly fix[ing] or
mak[ing] provision for determining the quantity and the price.”312 In contrast to
the UCC, article 15(1) contains a receipt, not a mailbox, rule: an offer becomes
effective when it “reaches,” as defined in article 24,313 the offeree.314 However,
“[a]n offer, even if it is irrevocable, may be withdrawn if the withdrawal reaches
the offeree before or at the same time as the offer.”315 In fact, “[u]ntil a contract
is concluded an offer may be revoked if the revocation reaches the offeree before
309
Smith v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LLP, 552 F. App’x 473, 478 (6th Cir. 2014) (enumerating the
elements required under Tennessee law).
310
Of course, in some situations, outcomes may still be identical. See, e.g., New World Trading Co. v. 2
Feet Prods., No. 11 civ. 6219 (SAS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17599, at *4 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2014). Some
courts, however, seem willing to posit a seamless identity and to overlook, via a self-evident assumption, the
significance of a possible divergence. See Harry Flechtner, Article 79 of the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) as Rorschach Test: The Homeward Trend and Exemption
for Delivering Non-Conforming Goods, 19 PACE INT’L L. REV. 29, 47–48 (2007).
311
CISG art. 23; Orica Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Aston Evaporative Servs., LLC, No. 14-cv-0412-WJM-CBS,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98248, at *15 (D. Colo. July 28, 2015).
312
CISG art. 14(1); It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim Hotelgesellschift mbH, No. 3:CV-11-2379, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 897, at *37–38 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2015); Joseph M. Perillo, Essay, UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts: The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 281, 320 (1994).
313
CISG art. 24; Charles H. Martin, The Electronic Contracts Convention, the CISG, and New Sources of
E-Commerce Law, 16 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 467, 481 (2008).
314
CISG art. 15(1); cf. Feng Chen, The New Era of Chinese Contract Law: History, Development and a
Comparative Analysis, 27 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 153, 173–74 (2001) (comparing Chinese contract law with
CISG).
315
CISG art. 15(2); Franco Ferrari, Formation of Contracts in South American Legal Systems, 16 LOY.
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 629, 642 n.102 (1994).
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he has dispatched an acceptance,” unless the offer declares its irrevocability or
the offeree relied upon the offer’s apparent irrevocability.316 Even if irrevocable,
an offeree’s rejection will terminate an offer whenever that rejection reaches the
offeror.317 Critically, “[a] statement made by or other conduct of the offeree
indicating assent to an offer is an acceptance;” nonetheless, “[s]ilence or
inactivity does not in itself amount to acceptance.”318
Whatever its form, an acceptance is effective at the moment the offeree’s
“indication of assent” reaches the offeror, but not if that indication does not
arrive within the time fixed by the offeror, as defined in article 20,319 or within
“a reasonable time.”320 Oral offers must be accepted “immediately unless the
circumstances indicate otherwise,”321 and provision is made for late
acceptances.322 In another pivotal difference with the UCC, CISG’s nineteenth
article adopts the “now discarded common law mirror rule with the exception
that minor differences do not defeat an otherwise valid acceptance.”323 Thus, if
an additional term contains even minimal “additions, limitations or other
modifications,” it amounts to a rejection and a counter-offer.324 But, unless those
additional terms are “material,” broadly defined as “relating, among other
things, to the price, payment, quality and quantity of the goods, place and time
of delivery, extent of one party’s liability to the other or the settlement of
disputes,”325 the original offeror’s failure to timely objects will be construed as

316
CISG art. 16(1)–(2). This importation of the UCC’s presumption of revocability into CISG’s sixteenth
article was a concession by civil law countries, one foreign to the civil law. See Courtney Parrish Smart,
Formation of Contracts in Louisiana under the United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods,
53 LA. L. REV. 1339, 1349–50 (1993) (explaining how CISG differed from Louisiana’s civil law system).
Notably, CISG still allows an offer to be irrevocable in only two instances. CISG art. 16(2)(a)–(b).
317
CISG art. 17; see also DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 335–36 (“Article 17 may be linked to Article
19 when the rejection is ambiguous, since it may be interpreted as a counteroffer (rejection) or as an
acceptance.”).
318
CISG art. 18(1); Solae, LLC v. Hershey Can., Inc., 557 F. Supp. 2d 452, 457 (D. Del. 2008).
319
CISG art. 20(1)–(2); Sarah Howard Jenkins, Contract Resurrected! Contract Formation: Common Law
~ UCC ~ CISG, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 245, 271–72 (2015).
320
CISG art. 18(2); Orica Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Aston Evaporative Servs., LLC, No. 14-cv-0412-WJMCBS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98248, at *10–11 (D. Colo. July 28, 2015); Anjanette H. Raymond, Manner,
Method, Receipt or Dispatch: The Use of Electronic Media is Nothing New to the Law, 52 LOY. L. REV. 1, 17
n.72 (2006).
321
CISG art. 18(2); Easom Automation Sys., Inc. v. Thyssenkrupp Fabco, Corp., No. 06-14553, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 72461, at *9–10 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2007).
322
CISG art. 21(1)–(2).
323
DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 349.
324
CISG art. 19(1); CSS Antenna, Inc. v. Amphenol-Tuchel Elecs., GmbH, 764 F. Supp. 2d 745, 752 (D.
Md. 2011).
325
CISG art. 19(3); VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co., 748 F.3d 780, 786 (7th Cir. 2014)
(contending that article 19(3) defines “‘materiality’ in a broad way that would appear to cover attorney’s fees
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an acceptance of “the offer with the modification contained in the
acceptance.”326 Once concluded, a contract can be modified by the parties’ mere
agreement unless the contract itself requires a written one.327 In other words,
“oral termination or modifications . . . are ineffective if the parties have
previously prescribed formalities to such acts.”328
Where CISG applies, several defenses that may be raised to a contract’s
enforcement, reflecting “certain familiarities”329 embedded in Anglo-American
contract law and otherwise available to offended buyers under the UCC and
relevant for a claim’s disallowance per § 502(b)(1) and a debt’s dischargeability
under § 523(a)(2), have no legal force.
First, as CISG contains no statute of frauds, it does not require contracts for
sale to be concluded in writing; a contract may be “proved by any means,
including witnesses.”330 Relatedly, binding modifications need not be reduced
to writing.331 Second, the parol evidence rule has no place in interpretation.332
Instead, per article 8(1), “statements made by and other conduct of a party are to
be interpreted according to his intent where the other party knew or could not
have been unaware what that intent was.”333 And while a reasonable person
standard applies when no such knowledge exists,334 article 8(3) vastly expands
the scope of the inquiry normally permitted: “In determining the intent of a party
and interest provisions”); 2P Commercial Agency S.R.O. v. SRT USA, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-652-FtM-29SPC, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9186, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2013) (quoting article 19(3)).
326
CISG art. 19(2); see, e.g., Belcher-Robinson, L.L.C. v. Linamar Corp., 699 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1337
(M.D. Ala. 2010); Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 426, 431–32 (E.D.N.Y. 2004);
Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1236, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); DiMatteo et al., supra
note 201, at 355.
327
CISG art. 29; Kabik, supra note 234, at 420.
328
DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 331.
329
Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 398 (3d Cir. 2010).
330
CISG art. 11; see also, e.g., Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 398 (3d Cir. 2010);
Miami Valley Paper LLC v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25201, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009).
331
CISG art. 29; see also, e.g., Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 398 (3d Cir. 2010);
Valero Mktg. & Supply Co. v. Greeni Oy, 242 F. App’x 840, 845 (3d Cir. 2007); Chateau Des Charmes Wines
LTD. v. Sabate USA Inc., 328 F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 2003). The term “writing” includes telegram and telex.
CISG art. 13.
332
CSS Antenna, Inc. v. Amphenol-Tuchel Elecs., GmbH, 764 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753 (D. Md. 2011);
accord, e.g., Weihai Textile Grp. Import & Export Co., Ltd. v. Level 8 Apparel, LLC, No. 11 Civ. 4405
(ALC)(FM), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53688, at *16–17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014). Per article 12, however, a
nation-state can make a declaration under article 96 to exempt itself from this embracing this informal system.
CISG art. 12.
333
CISG art. 8(1); MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr. v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, S.P.A., 144 F.3d 1384,
1387 n.7 (11th Cir. 1998).
334
CISG art. 8(2); Turfworthy, LLC v. Dr. Karl Wetekam & Co. KG, 26 F. Supp. 3d 496, 503–04
(M.D.N.C. 2014).
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or the understanding a reasonable person would have had, due consideration is
to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations,
any practices which the parties have established between themselves, usages and
any subsequent conduct of the parties.”335 Due to these related tenets, “[c]ontrary
to what is familiar practice in United States courts,” CISG permits “a substantial
inquiry into the parties’ subjective intent, even if the parties did not engage in
any objectively ascertainable means of registering this intent.”336 With CISG
rejecting the Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule,337 neither a debtor
nor a creditor will be able to negate a contract simply due to the absence of an
objective text. One exception does exist: an express merger clause, permissible
under article 29, may foreclose use of extrinsic evidence in the same manner as
allowed under the UCC.338
2. Code Application of CISG’s Oddities
Based on the foregoing, the following intelligence can be drawn. So as to
ascertain whether a Code cognizable “claim,” as defined in § 101, could exist
for purposes of §§ 501, 502, and 523 and Rule 3018(a),339 a court must disregard
the statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule and apply the receipt and the
mirror image doctrines.340 In the process of disregarding the former duo and
utilizing the latter twosome, the court must be prepared to make a “substantial
inquiry into the parties’ subjective intent, even if the parties did not engage in
any objectively ascertainable means of registering this intent,” in deciding
whether an enforceable contract had ever effectively been struck.341
Concurrently, the court must interpret even ambiguous contractual provisions in
light of CISG’s ascertainable general principles and verifiable trade usage.342

335
CISG art. 8(3); Tuftworthy LLC, 26 F. Supp. at 504; ECEM European Chem. Mktg. B.V. v. Purolite
Co., No. 05-3078, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7373, at *30–31 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010).
336
MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova d’Agostino, S.p.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1387 (11th
Cir. 1998); see also Fercus, S.R.L. v. Palazzo, No. 98 CIV. 7728 (NRB), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11086, at *7–
8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2000) (applying the U.C.C.).
337
Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l. Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1238 n. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also, e.g.,
Claudia v. Olivieri Footwear Ltd., No. 96 Civ. 8052(HB) (THK), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4586, at *14 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 7, 1998).
338
DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 333 (citing MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc., 144 F.3d at 1391). But
see CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 3 (“The effect [of a merger clause] may be to prevent a party from
relying on evidence of statements or agreements not contained in the writing . . . [and] may bar evidence of trade
usages. However, in determining the effect of such a Merger Clause, the parties’ statements and negotiations, as
well as all other relevant circumstances shall be taken into account.”).
339
See supra Part III.B–D.
340
See supra Part V.A.1.
341
MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., 144 F.3d at 1387.
342
See supra Part IV.C.3.
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Effectively, so as to do so in the most reasonable and predictable fashion,
thereby honoring international trade’s need for uniform and predictable rules,
UNIDROIT’s nine precepts and ICC’s Incoterms must be utilized to demarcate
undefined terms and fill unexpected gaps.343 Though debate continues,
consistent with modern interpretive constraints,344 the good-faith principle
implicit in every contract345 and sanctioned by the UCC has no place where
CISG reigns.346
B. Duties and Breach Defined
1. Summary of Relevant Articles
Under CISG, the seller,347 whether or not that entity was the original offeror
or offeree, must comply with a series of express commands to avoid committing
a breach, however material or fundamental it may later be proven to be. A seller
“must deliver the goods, hand over any documents relating to them[,] and
transfer the property in the goods, as required by the contract and this
Convention.”348 If the contract itself does not specify a “particular place” for the
goods’ delivery, a seller satisfies his, her, or its delivery obligation in one of
three ways: (1) “if the contract of sale involves carriage of the goods, in handing
the goods over to the first carrier for transmission to the buyer”; (2) in other
cases, if the contract “relates to specific goods[] or [to] unidentified goods to be
drawn from a specific stock or to be manufactured or produced, and at the time
of the conclusion of the contract the parties knew that the goods were at, or were
to be manufactured or produced at, a particular place—in placing the goods at
the buyer’s disposal at that place”; or (3) in all other cases, “in placing the goods

343

See supra Part IV.C.3.
See supra Part IV.
345
Cf. Shachmurove, Claims, supra note 46, at 564–65 (summarizing the “ancient” obligation of good
faith and fair dealing).
346
See, e.g., DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 319 (discussing the reliance and uncertain foundation for
this principle); Richard E. Spiedel, The Revision of UCC Article 2, Sales in Light of the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 16 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 165, 177 (1995) (“CISG
imposes no explicit duty of good faith in the performance or enforcement of the contract for sale[,]” yet “‘good
faith and fair dealing’ is a fundamental idea underlying the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts as well.”).
347
Once a contract has been concluded, the terms “offeree” and “offerror” are no longer apposite. Instead,
CISG divided responsibilities between the goods’ seller (or the deliverer) and the buyer or purchaser of the
designated goods (or the recipient).
348
CISG art. 30; Urica, Inc. v. Pharmaplast S.A.E., No. CV 11-02476 MMM (RZx), 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 110015, at *45–46 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014); Douglas A. Hass, A Gentleman’s Agreement Assessing the
Gnu General Public License and Its Adaptation to Linux, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. L. 213, 224 n.100 (2007).
344
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at the buyer’s disposal at the place where the seller had his place of business at
the time of the conclusion of the contract.”349
Under article 32, if the seller employs a carrier and the goods are not “clearly
identified to the contract” by their own markings, “the seller must give the buyer
notice of the consignment specifying the goods.”350 Logically, “[i]f the seller is
bound to arrange for carriage of the goods, he must make such contracts as are
necessary for carriage to the place fixed by means of transportation appropriate
in the circumstances and according to the usual terms for such transportation.”351
Governed by article 34, delivery of critical documents is subject to a similar
structure.352 Article 33 sets forth the rules for ascertaining the proper time for
delivery. “[I]f a date is fixed by or determinable from the contract,” the seller
must deliver the goods on that date or “at any time within that period unless
circumstances indicate that the buyer is to choose a date.”353 “[I]n any other
case,” the seller must do so “within a reasonable time after the conclusion of the
contract.”354 Like other CISG provisions littered with the ambiguous
“reasonable,” articles 31, 32, and 34 are interpreted pursuant to article 9.355 To
wit, use of trade terms and consideration of the parties’ courses of dealing and
performance will determine the propriety of the location and means of
transportation ultimately chosen.356
Assuming a seller has timely delivered the goods, one more hurdle must be
cleared. As article 35(1) makes clear, “[t]he seller must deliver goods which are
of the quantity, quality and description required by the contract and which are

349
CISG art. 31 (emphasis added); Ronald A. Brand, CISG Article 31: When Substantive Law Rules Affect
Jurisdictional Results, 25 J. L. & COM. 181, 182 & n.1 (2005) (“CISG Article 31 sets up four rules for
determining the place of performance of the seller’s obligation to deliver goods: a party autonomy rule followed
by three default rules.”).
350
CISG art. 32(1); Martini R Ricci Iamino S.P.A. – Consortile Societa Agricola v. Trinity Fruit Sales
Co., 30 F. Supp. 3d 954, 969 (E.D. Cal. 2014).
351
CISG art. 32(2); Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Seachem, No. H-07-2950, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72898, at
*21–22 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 2013); DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 385–86.
352
CISG art. 34; John C. Duncan, Jr., Nachfrist Was Ist? Thinking Globally and Acting Locally:
Considering Time Extension Principles of the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
in Revising the Uniform Commercial Code, 2000 BYU. L. REV. 1363, 1380 (2000); Henry D. Gabriel, A Primer
on the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods: From the Perspective of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 7 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 279, 294 (1997).
353
CISG art. 33(a)–(b); New World Trading Co. v. 2 Feet Prods., Nos. 11 Civ. 6219 (SAS), 13 Civ. 1251
(SAS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68304, at *23 & n.124 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2014) (citing art. 33(a)).
354
CISG art. 33(c); Alpha Prime Dev. Corp. v. Holland Loader Co., No. 09-cv-01763-WYD-KMT, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67591, at *18 (D. Colo. July 6, 2010); Norfolk S. Ry. v. Power Source Supply, Inc., No. 0658 J, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56942, at *9–10 (W.D. Pa. July 25, 2008).
355
See supra Part IV.C.
356
DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 385, 389.
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contained or packaged in the manner required by the contract.”357 Unless the
parties have agreed otherwise, the delivered goods will be deemed
nonconforming, the seller in breach, in four cases: (1) they are not “fit for the
purposes for which goods of the same description would ordinarily be used”; (2)
they are not “fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known
to the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract”; (3) they do not
“possess the qualities of goods which the seller has held out to the buyer as a
sample or model”; or (4) they are not “contained or packaged in the manner
usual for such goods or, where there is no such manner, in a manner adequate to
preserve and protect the goods.”358
A seller remains liable for any lack of conformity which exists “at the time
when the risk passes to the buyer, even though the lack of conformity becomes
apparent only after that time”359 and even afterward if this dearth was “due to a
breach of any of . . . [the seller’s] obligations.”360 In these situations, article 35
itself provides a seller with two safe harbors of varying effectiveness. First, the
seller may still correct any nonconformity if the offending goods were delivered
before the set “date for delivery,” assuming “the exercise of this right does not
cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expense;” the
seller will nonetheless remain liable for any damages traceable to the original
nonconformity.361 Second, the seller will avoid any liability under article 35 “if
at the time of the conclusion of the contract the buyer knew or could not have
been unaware of such lack of conformity.”362 So structured, article 35(2) appears
to incorporate the implied warranties for a particular purpose.363 In contrast with
the UCC, these warranties may be disclaimed so long as the parties have agreed

357
CISG art. 35(1); St. Tropez Inc. v. Ningbo Maywood Indus. & Trade Co., No. 13 Civ. 5230 (NRB),
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96840, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014).
358
CISG art. 35(2)(a)–(d); Miami Valley Paper LLC v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No. 1:05CV-00702, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25201, at *28 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009) (incorrectly citing to article 35(3)).
359
CISG art. 36(1); Orica Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Aston Evaporative Servs., LLC, No. 14-cv-0412-WJMCBS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98248, at *20 (D. Colo. July 28, 2015); Alpha Prime Dev. Corp. v. Holland Loader
Co., No. 09-cv-01763-WYD-KMT, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67591, at *15 (D. Colo. July 6, 2010); Chi. Prime
Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2005).
360
CISG art. 36(2) (emphasis added); TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, No. 00 Civ. 5189
(RCC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59455, at *44 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2006).
361
CISG art. 37; David G. Fagan, The Remedial Provisions of the Vienna Convention on the International
Sale of Goods 1980: A Small Business Perspective, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 317, 344 n.177 (1998).
362
CISG art. 35(3); In re Siskiyou Evergreens, Inc., No. 02-66975-fra11, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1044, at *7
(Bankr. D. Or. Mar. 29, 2004).
363
Kabik, supra note 234, at 420.
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to do orally or in writing or the buyer knew or could not have been unaware of
the nonconformity.364
The buyer, naturally enough, must adhere to separate set of often reciprocal
obligations.365 Generally, “[t]he buyer must pay the price for the goods and take
delivery of them as required by the contract and this Convention,”366 including
taking “taking such steps and complying with such formalities as may be
required under the contract or any laws and regulations to enable payment to be
made.”367 Article 57 governs the buyer’s obligation to remit payment;368 article
58 is applicable when the contract establishes no specific time for payment; 369
and article 59 makes clear the buyer’s obligation to “pay the price on the date
fixed by or determinable from the contract and this Convention without the need
for any request or compliance with any formality on the part of the seller.”370
The buyer must also take delivery, which consists of two distinct tasks: (1)
“doing all the acts which could reasonably be expected of him in order to enable
the seller to make delivery,” and (2) “taking over the goods.”371
Moreover, “[l]oss of or damage to the goods after the risk has passed to the
buyer does not discharge him from his obligation to pay the price, unless the loss
or damage is due to an act or omission of the seller.”372 Per article 67(1), “[i]f
364
Compare CISG art. 35(3), with U.C.C. § 2-316 (“[T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be
conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and
conspicuous.”).
365
See Tacy Katherine Hass, New Governance: Can User-Promulgated Certification Schemes Provide
Safer, Higher Quality Food?, 68 FOOD DRUG L.J. 77, 91 (2013) (noting that “the buyer’s main duty under the
CISG” is “to pay for the goods he has purchased, elaborated in Articles 53 and 54”).
366
CISG art. 53; Victoria Alloys, Inc. v. Fortis Bank SA/NV (In re Victoria Alloys, Inc.), 261 B.R. 424,
431 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).
367
CISG art. 54; Hilaturas Miel S.L. v. Republic of Iraq, 573 F. Supp. 2d 781, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 2008);
Alejandro Osuna-Gonzalez, Buyer’s Enabling Steps to Pay the Price: Article 54 of the United Nation’s
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 25 J. L. & COM. 299, 302–07 (2005) (dissecting
article).
368
CISG art. 57; Franco Ferrari, PIL and CISG: Friends or Foes?, 31 J. L. & COM. 45, 89 n.219 (2013).
For clarity’s sake, “PIL” refers to private international law.
369
CISG art. 58; Urica, Inc. v. Pharmaplast S.A.E., No. CV 11-02476 MMM (RZx), 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 110015, at *48 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014).
370
CISG art. 59; Le Pupille v. Nickolas Imps., No. 1:12-cv-668-TRJ, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188823,
at*3–4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 7, 2013).
371
CISG art. 60(a)–(b); Henry D. Gabriel, The Buyer’s Performance under the CISG: Articles 53-60, 25
J. L. & COM. 273, 282 (2005) (“Article 60 43 articulates the requirements of the second of the buyer’s primary
responsibilities under Article 53”: to “take delivery of the goods.”).
372
CISG art. 66; Donald L. Grace, Comment, Force Majeure, China & the CISG: Is China’s New Contract
Law a Step in the Right Direction?, 2 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 173, 192 (2001) (“The theory of passage of risk,”
as embodied in article 66, “is consistent with the contractual norm of leaving the parties at status quo when a
contract becomes terminated due to a force majeure event.”).
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the contract of sale involves carriage of the goods and the seller is not bound to
hand them over at a particular place, the risk passes to the buyer when the goods
are handed over to the first carrier for transmission to the buyer in accordance
with the contract of sale.”373 In fact, “[t]he risk in respect of goods sold in transit
passes to the buyer from the time of the conclusion of the contract,” unless “the
seller knew or ought to have known that the goods had been lost or damaged and
did not disclose this to the buyer” at the time of the contract’s conclusion.374
However, this risk will not pass unless and until “the goods are clearly identified
to the contract, whether by markings on the goods, by shipping documents, by
notice given to the buyer or otherwise.”375 By virtue of these interlocking
articles, the risk of loss passes under CISG without regard to the goods’ actual
owner.376
Closely linked to the deliverer’s obligations under article 35, a buyer has a
duty to inspect the delivered goods and provide the seller with any notice of
nonconformity under CISG. To satisfy article 38, this examination must occur
“within as short a period as is practicable in the circumstances,”377 though it may
be deferred in two expressly identified situations,378 and be “reasonable.”379 The
first requirement—“as is practicable”—has been strictly construed as
necessitating great promptness;380 based on these and similar cases, scholars
have concluded that inspection may be deferred under article 38(1) only when
“the buyer is a mere intermediary or when the goods are delivered directly to
end users” or can show “the absence of a real opportunity to examine all of the
goods.”381 Imported into CISG, the second—that the inspection must be
“reasonable”— depends on “the provisions of the contract in question, usage of
373
CISG art. 67(1); St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Med. Sys. & Support, No. 00 Civ. 9344
(SHS), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5096, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002).
374
CISG art. 68; Sandeep Gopalan, Transnational Commercial Law: The Way Forward, 18 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. 803, 807 n.12 (2003).
375
CISG art. 67(2); Jan Ramberg, To What Extent Do Incoterms 2000 Vary Articles 67(2), 68 and 69?, 25
J. L. & COM. 219, 220 (2006).
376
St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5096, at *13.
377
CISG art. 38(1); Electrocraft Arkansas, Inc. v. Super Electric Motors, Ltd., No. 4:09cv00318 SWW,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85610, at *17 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 19, 2010).
378
CISG art. 38(2)–(3); Profi-Parkiet Sp. Zoo v. Seneca Hardwoods LLC, No. 13 CV 4358 (PKC)(LB),
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71289, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2014) (citing article 28(2)); Chi. Prime Packers, Inc.
v. Northam Food Trading Co., 320 F. Supp. 2d 702, 709 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (citing article 38(2) and (3)).
379
DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 362.
380
Shuttle Packaging Sys. LLC v. Tsonakis, No. 1:01-CV-691, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21630, at *26
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2001) (“[T]he wording of CISG reveals an intent that buyers examine the goods promptly
and give notice of defects to sellers promptly.” (then setting up a deadline of two years for barring late notices));
accord Electrocraft Arkansas, Inc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85610, at *20 (citing Chi. Prime Packers, Inc, 320 F.
Supp. 2d at 711–12).
381
DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 362.
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the trade, the type of goods, and the technical facilities and expertise of the
parties.”382 Despite this necessarily flexible standard, the buyer will be held
responsible for the failure to discover “nonconformity readily apparent from” a
reasonable inspection and will only be excused from a “complete examination”
if the “quantity or nature of the products renders comprehensive inspection
unreasonable.”383 Under article 39, after such an inspection, a buyer must give
specific notice of the goods’ partial or complete nonconformity within a
“reasonable time,” a standard more strictly construed under CISG than the UCC,
or, at most, within two years from the goods’ delivery.384
Like the seller, the buyer has two weapons at his, her, or its disposal even if
the notice sent was either untimely or too general. First, this failure will be
deemed immaterial “if the lack of conformity relates to facts of which he knew
or could not have been unaware and which he did not disclose to the buyer.”385
Second, regardless of article 39, “the buyer may reduce the price in accordance
with article 50 or claim damages, except for loss of profit, if he has a reasonable
excuse for his failure to give the required notice.”386
Both deliverers and recipients may make use of article 79 and bear a duty to
preserve any goods ordered or received. Article 79 excuses nonperformance
upon a three-part showing: (1) “the failure [to perform] was due to an
impediment beyond . . . [the breaching party’s] control”; (2) that party “could
not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the
time of the conclusion of the contract”; and (3) that same party could not have
reasonably “avoided or overcome” this impediment “or its consequences.”387
Distinct from the common law’s impossibility standard and the UCC’s own
impracticability variant,388 a distinction famously missed by one court,389 this
test focuses on the causal link between the asserted impediment and the

382

Id.
Id. at 363.
384
CISG art. 39(1)–(2); Ferrari, supra note 233, at 111. If a delivery is only partially nonconforming, then
the buyer may only invoke CISG’s remedial provisions as to that portion unless that partial failure alone amounts
to a “fundamental breach.”
385
CISG art. 40; BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador (Petroecuador), 332 F.3d 333,
338 (5th Cir. 2003).
386
CISG art. 44. Unsurprisingly, the definition of “reasonable excuse” is contested and unsettled.
DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 370.
387
CISG art. 79(1); JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION § 423.4 (2d ed. 1991).
388
Bruno Zeller, The Challenge of a Uniform Application of the CISG – Common Problems and Their
Solutions, 3 MACQUARIE J. BUS. L. 309, 313 (2006).
389
Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1029 (2d Cir. 1995).
383
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breaching party’s inability to perform.390 In particular, attention must be paid to
the impediment’s reasonable foreseeability, the breaching party’s control of this
unexpected barrier, and the practices of international trade.391 Complicating any
such analysis is the absence of any definition for the word “impediment” and the
phrase “due to” in article 79.392 Still, that performance has become
unforeseeably more difficult or unprofitable will not suffice to establish an
impediment.393 Article 85 obliges the seller to “take such steps as are reasonable
in the circumstances to preserve” goods if “the seller is either in possession of
the goods or otherwise able to control their disposition” and the buyer has
delayed in paying the price or taking delivery.394 Its counterpart, article 86 reads:
“If the buyer has received the goods and intends to exercise any right under the
contract or this Convention to reject them, he must take such steps to preserve
them as are reasonable in the circumstances.”395 Any unreasonable delay in
completing performance or as to goods subject to rapid deterioration or
unreasonably expensive to store automatically allows a party to sell the relevant
goods, provided notice of this intention has been given to the breaching party.396
Under CISG, a breach may be either fundamental or non-fundamental. The
latter engenders no more than a right to damages as measured by several CISG
articles;397 the former entitles the non-breaching party not only to damages but
also to the remedy of avoidance.398 As defined in CISG’s article 25, “[a] breach
of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in such
detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him [or her] of what he
[or she] is entitled to expect under the contract.”399 Divided into its two clear
elements, a “fundamental” breach is uniquely material, substantially depriving
a party of the bargain’s benefits, and results in a deprivation that was reasonably

390

Mazzotta, supra note 217, at 108.
Todd Weitzmann, Comment, Validity and Excuse in the U.N. Sales Convention, 16 J.L. & COM. 265,
286 (1997).
392
Id. at 282.
393
DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 425.
394
CISG art. 85; see Jianming Shen, The Remedy of Requiring Performance under the CISG and the
Relevance of Domestic Rules, 13 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 253, 276 (1996) (“Articles 85 through 88 impose
upon the parties general duties of preservation and disposal of the goods.”).
395
CISG art. 86(1); Charles Sukurs, Note, Harmonizing the Battle of the Forms: A Comparison of the
United States, Canada, and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 34
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1481, 1508 n.190 (2001).
396
CISG art. 88(1)–(2).
397
See infra Part V.C.1.
398
Schwenzer, supra note 295, at 799.
399
CISG art. 25; Valero Mktg. & Supply Co. v. Greeni Oy, No. 01-5254 (DRD), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16620, at *24 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2006); Hilaturas Miel, S.L., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 799 (defining “fundamental breach”
under CISG).
391
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foreseeable at the time of the contract’s formation.400 Though the term is
inescapably vague,401 based on this two-part delineation, at least seven actions
have been regarded as “fundamental breaches” by a multitude of courts,
including: (1) non-delivery or refusal to deliver goods, though not a failure to
fulfill a minor condition; (2) late delivery if time of performance is of the
essence, a seller knows of the buyer’s urgent need, the prices of the goods
purchased are subject to extreme fluctuations, or the buyer has already fixed an
additional period for delivery after the seller’s initial failure to timely deliver;
the seller infringes (3) a resale restriction, (4) a valid exclusive sales agreement,
or (5) a re-import restriction;402 (6) “non-payment of the purchase price,”
characterized by one court as “the most significant form of a fundamental breach
by a buyer”;403 or (7) the non-conformity of the delivered goods.
Interestingly, nonperformance will not alone constitute a fundamental
breach as long as “prior to the date for performance of the contract it is clear that
one of the parties will commit a fundamental breach of contract” and “the party
intending to declare the contract avoided . . . give[s] reasonable notice to the
other party in order to permit him [or her] to provide adequate assurance of his
[or her] performance.”404 This latter provision as to notice does not apply “if the
other party has [already] declared that he [or she] will not perform his
obligations.”405 Any such breach as to one delivery of an installment contract
does not entitle the non-breaching party to assert a fundamental breach of the
entire contract.406 The latter is only justified if this discrete failure “gives the
other party good grounds to conclude that a fundamental breach of contract will
occur with respect to future instalments” as well.407 When viewed overall, then,

400
CISG art. 25; Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Seachem, No. H-07-2950, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72898, at
*27–28 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 2013); see also, e.g., Harry M. Flechtner, Remedies under the New International
Sales Convention: The Perspective from Article 2 of the U.C.C., 8 J. L. & COM. 53, 57, 75 (1988); DiMatteo et
al., supra note 201, at 414.
401
Clemens Pauly, The Concept of Fundamental Breach as an International Principle to Create
Uniformity of Commercial Law, 19 J. L. & COM. 221, 229 (2000).
402
Ulrich Magnus, The Remedy of Avoidance of Contract under CISG – General Remarks and Special
Cases, 25 J. L. & COM. 423, 432–35 (2005-06) (finding (1) through (5) from a series of international cases);
Shuttle Packaging Sys. L.L.C. v. Tsonakis, No. 1:01-CV-691, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21630, at *27–28 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 17, 2001) (positing (6)).
403
Shuttle Packaging Sys. L.L.C. v. Tsonakis, No. 1:01-CV-691, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21630, at *27–
28 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2001).
404
CISG art. 72(1)–(2); Magellan Int’l Corp. v. Salzgitter Handel GmbH, 76 F. Supp. 2d 919, 925 (N.D.
Ill. 1999).
405
CISG art. 72(3); Magellan Int’l Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d at 925.
406
CISG art. 73(1); Blair, supra note 175, at 313 n.197.
407
CISG art. 73(2); Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp. L.L.C., 635 F.3d 1106, 1108 n.2
(8th Cir. 2011).
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CISG strives to preserve the contract short of the most dramatic of violations of
a bargain provably struck.
2. Code Application of CISG’s Oddities
Now moving decisively beyond the UCC’s terrain, the foregoing articles
create a novel set of duties and concept of breach. Whether a breach has occurred
sufficient to trigger liability and, with it, a Code claim, these interlocking tenets
must be applied. Whether the debtor is a seller or buyer, a failure to comply with
these requirements may leave a debtor subject to a cause of action under
§ 523(a)(2). These consequences arise from this subsection’s common
construal: an omission of a material fact and a failure to make an effort to
perform, both misdeeds actionable under § 523(a)(2)(A), and actions
inconsistent with those of a reasonable person, such substandard conduct
triggering liability under § 523(A)(2)(B), must be measured by the debtor’s
duties, as imposed by the pertinent contract and these sundry CISG articles. If
the debtor fulfilled its CISG-imposed duties, no contractual breach could have
taken place, but if it ignored them, it has not only birthed a claim but also
violated § 523(a)(2). Lastly, CISG alone will determine how the breach—and
liability for a debt—must be classified, whether branded as “fundamental” or
something else entirely.
C. Measuring Damages
1. Summary of Relevant Articles
Articles 45 and 61 establish the cumulative remedies available to a nonbreaching buyer and seller, respectively.408 In accordance with article 61(1), an
aggrieved seller may require the buyer’s performance as defined in article 62,
fix an additional time for compliance as permitted by article 63, avoid or cancel
the contract under article 64, or have the goods identified under the contract per
article 65.409 In addition to one of these remedies, the seller may seek damages
as measured under article 74.410 Under article 45(1), an aggrieved buyer may
require performance or substitute performance under article 46(2), demand
repair of defective goods under article 46(3), fix an additional time for
408
CISG arts. 45, 61; Harry M. Flechtner, Buyers’ Remedies in General and Buyers’ PerformanceOriented Remedies, 25 J.L. & COM. 339, 341 (2005–06).
409
CISG art. 61(1)(a); Fabio Bortolotti, Remedies Available to the Seller and Seller’s Right to Require
Specific Performance (Articles 61, 62, and 28), 25 J.L. & COM. 335, 335 (2005–06).
410
CISG art. 61(1)(b), (2); Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Group L.L.C., 635 F.3d 1106,
1108 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing to article 61(1)).
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performance under article 47, accept a seller’s cured performance under articles
37 and 48, avoid or cancel the contract under article 49, or unilaterally reduce
the sales price pursuant to article 50.411 In addition to one of these nonmonetary
remedies, the buyer may ask for any and all damages authorized by article 74.412
Intended to provide the injured party with the bargain’s benefit,413 article 74
sets the general rule for damages: “Damages for breach of contract by one party
consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other
party as a consequence of the breach.”414 As widely construed, this article does
not require that damages be proven with “reasonable certainty.”415
Regardless of the breach’s nature; however, CISG expressly limits the size
of any award under article 74 by means of two provisions. Article 74’s second
sentence specifically subjects any damages determination to a foreseeability
principle; thus, damages may not exceed “the loss which the party in breach
foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract,
in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have
known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract.”416 The second
restriction is the mitigation principle provided for in article 77, which directs the
non-breaching party “[to] take such measures as are reasonable in the
circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, resulting from the
breach.”417 Failure to do so entitles the breaching party “[to] claim a reduction
in the damages in the amount by which the loss should have been mitigated.”418
Once damages under article 74 have been tabulated, article 78 allows for interest
“without prejudice to any claim for damages recoverable” under the latter
article.419 The expenses for preserving goods received or to be delivered, set

411

CISG art. 45(1)(a); Flechtner, supra note 408, at 340.
CISG art. 45(1)(b), (2); TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, No. 00 Civ. 5189 (RCC),
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59455, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2006).
413
Eric C. Schneider, Measuring Damages under the CISG – Article 74 of the United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 9 PACE INT’L L. REV. 223, 228 (1997).
414
CISG art. 74; Zapata Hermanos Sucesores v. Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d 385, 388 (7th Cir. 2002).
415
Schneider, supra note 413, at 229.
416
CISG art. 74; Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1029 (2d Cir. 1995).
417
CISG art. 77; Schneider, supra note 413, at 236–37.
418
CISG art. 77; 2P Commercial Agency S.R.O. v. SRT USA, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-652-FtM-29SPC, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112706, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2012).
419
CISG art. 78. Because CISG “provides no guidance for calculating such interest and gives no indication
of the circumstances under which pre-judgment interest should be awarded,” Schneider, supra note 413, at 230–
31, domestic and foreign courts almost uniformly regard the matter as a procedural issue outside of CISG’s
scope, Djakhongir Saidov, Damages: The Need for Uniformity, 25 J.L. & COM. 393, 399 (2005–06).
412
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forth in articles 85 and 86, are equally recoverable from the breaching party or
deductible from the sales proceeds.420
Of the aforementioned nonfinancial remedies, that of avoidance, available
to buyers under article 49 and sellers under article 64, “releases both parties from
their obligations under it, subject to any damages which may be due.”421 A
cabined remedy, CISG’s avoidance provisions can only be invoked either when
a breach is fundamental or when the other party does not fulfill any of his, her,
or its obligations within the additional time,422 if any, granted by the nonbreaching party.423 Further subject to the constraints in article 49(2) whenever
delivery has been made, or article 64(2) when the price has been paid,424
avoidance further requires that notice both be given and be properly
communicated,425 though notice may be in writing or orally, CISG itself
requiring no specific form.426 If a contract is avoided and either the buyer has
entered into a substitute transaction or the seller has resold the goods, the
damages must equal “the difference between the contract price and the price in
the substitute transaction.”427 If the contract is avoided but neither a substitute
transaction or a resale has transpired, the aggrieved party may instead “recover
the difference between the price fixed by the contract and the current price at the
time of avoidance.”428 “Current price” is defined in article 76(2) as “the price
prevailing at the place where delivery of the goods should have been made or, if
there is no current price at that place, the price at such other place as serves as a
reasonable substitute, making due allowance for differences in the cost of
transporting the goods.”429
On the other hand, if a party operating under article 76 has taken over the
goods prior to the contract’s proper avoidance, “the current price at the time of
such taking over shall be applied instead of the current price at the time of
420

CISG arts. 85, 86(1), 88(3).
CISG art. 81(1); Topp Paper Co., LLC v. ETI Converting Equip., No. 12-21014-CIVRosenbaum/Seltzer, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141193, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2013).
422
The procedure to be followed in such cases is known as the “Nachfirst procedure” and is detailed in
articles 47 and 63.
423
CISG arts. 49(1), 64(1); Flechtner, supra note 400, at 70.
424
CISG arts. 49(2), 64(2).
425
CISG arts. 26–27.
426
Magnus, supra note 402, at 426.
427
CISG art. 75; Semi-Materials Co. v. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc., No. 4:06CV1426 FRB, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1791, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 2011).
428
CISG art. 76(1); Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp. L.L.C., 635 F.3d 1106, 1108 n.2
(8th Cir. 2011).
429
CISG art. 76(2); Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp., L.L.C., No. No. 08762(DSD/SRN), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51066, at *5 (D. Minn. July 1, 2008), rev’d, 635 F.3d 1106.
421
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avoidance.”430 Under articles 75 and 76, the aggrieved party may claim any and
all “further damages recoverable under article 74.”431 Avoidance concurrently
allows both the breaching and no-breaching party to “claim restitution from the
other party of whatever the first party has supplied or paid under the contract.”432
2. Code Application of CISG’s Oddities
Generally, perhaps as a consequence of their pro-buyer proclivities, CISG
and the UCC catalogue the same remedies, as aggrieved party can cancel a
contract, sue for performance, or collect damages, including consequential
damages,433 and set a similar upper limit as to damages.434 Yet, as perusal
reveals, several pivotal differences as to these remedies’ extent and exercise can
be pinpointed. Touching upon how a breach is to be monetized and unrealized
bargains are to be quantified, these distinctions can produce vastly different
valuations of the same contractual violation and thus any potential creditor’s
bankruptcy claim.
In certain ways, CISG’s application will yield a claim larger than the UCC
countenances. First, because CISG elects for no precise or certain statute of
limitations,435 no time’s passing will necessarily extinguish a valid action for
breach of contract. Conversely, the UCC both specifies that “a cause of action
accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of
knowledge of the breach”436 and implements a four-year maximum.437 Second,
while CISG and the UCC provide that warranties exist only as provided for in
the parties’ agreement,438 the former’s article 35 can be properly read to suggest
430
CISG art. 76(1); Saidov, supra note 369, at 321 n.71; Jeffrey S. Sutton, Comment, Measuring Damages
under the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 737, 746 (1989).
431
CISG arts. 75, 76(1); DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 419.
432
CISG art. 81(2); Frisch, supra note 177, at 552 & n.287.
433
CISG arts. 45–52, 61–65, 74–77; U.C.C. §§ 2-703, 2-711. This congruence may be partly due to the
federal courts’ use of the UCC to construe CISG’s central damages provision, article 74. See Delchi Carrier Spa
v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1030 n.2 (2d Cir. 1995) (interpreting article 74 by looking to the U.C.C. and
case law defining “incidental damages”).
434
Compare CISG art. 74, with General Star Indem. Co. v. Bankr. Estate of Lake Geneva Sugar Shack,
Inc., 572 N.W.2d 881, 889 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Wisconsin’s version of the U.C.C., which limits
consequential damages to those “as are the natural and probable consequences of the breach and were within
contemplation of the parties when the contract was made”).
435
See, e.g., U.S. Nonwovens Corp. v Pack Line Corp., 4 N.Y.S.3d 868, 873 (N.Y. Gen. Term 2015).
Unsurprisingly, this absence has often led courts to borrow the U.C.C. statute of limitations in accordance with
article 7. See, e.g., Thyssenkrupp Metallurgical Prods. GmbH v Energy Coal, No. 653938/14, 2015 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 3741, at *11–12 (N.Y. Gen. Term Oct. 14, 2015); U.S. Nonwovens Corp., 4 N.Y.S.3d at 873.
436
U.C.C. § 2-725(b).
437
Id. § 2-725(a).
438
Compare CISG art. 35(1), with U.C.C. § 2-313.
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the existence of implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose and
merchantability439—and actually eases a buyer’s burden of proving the former’s
breach relative to the UCC.440 Third, in a likely reflection of its ambivalence
regarding the issue of consequential damages,441 the UCC allows the buyer to
seek consequential and incidental damages442 but bars the seller from obtaining
anything other than incidental damages.443 CISG, however, explicitly authorizes
any aggrieved party, whether buyer or seller, to pursue consequential and
incidental damages,444 subject to the limitations of foreseeability and
mitigation.445 In fact, CISG differs in two more crucial particulars from the UCC
and its attendant case law as to this very issue: it both allows an aggrieved party
first to declare the contract voided and then demand damages446 and does not
require that any loss be foreseeable by both parties at the time of the contract’s
conclusion.447 Under CISG, then, a simple claim may exceed its total value
under the UCC.448
In other ways, however, CISG would constrict, not augment, any contractual
claim. Most significantly, this treaty recommends a higher bar for imposing
liability for breach of contract. On the other hand, because the UCC recognizes
the perfect tender rule, it empowers a buyer to reject goods that fail in any respect
to conform to the contract even if a defect is minor and substantially the same
goods for which the buyer has bargained have been delivered;449 a minor defect,
then, may rightly engender the full panoply of contractual damages. In contrast,
439
See, e.g., Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd., No. 4:09cv00318 SWW, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 120183, at *11 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009); Norfolk S. Rail Ry. V. Power Source Supply, Inc., Civ. No.
06-58 J, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56942, at *14 (W.D. Pa. July 25, 2008).
440
Compare CISG art. 35(2), with U.C.C. § 2-315.
441
See U.C.C. § 1-305(a).
442
Id. § 2-715.
443
Id. § 2-710. Recovery by sellers for consequential damages may be possible, however, if the “lost
profit” language of section 2-708(2) is liberally applied. Id. § 2-708(2). Another avenue for accomplishing the
same result would be for the seller to argue that the loss falls under the heading of incidental damages.
444
See CISG art. 74. Naturally enough, CISG itself complicates this analysis by defining damages as “a
sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach.” Id.
(emphasis added). Courts and scholars nonetheless construe article 74 as authorizing recovery of all damages,
however labeled, traceable to the breach.
445
See CISG arts. 74, 77.
446
Compare id. at art. 45(2), with U.C.C. §§ 2-711(1), 2-703.
447
Compare CISG art. 74, with U.C.C. §§ 2-715(2)(a).
448
One more difference merits mention. Famously, CISG treats specific performance as a standard
remedy, claimable “unless the buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement,” while
the UCC disfavors such a tonic’s imposition, strictly specifying how and in what circumstances specific
performance may be compelled.Logically, when specific performance is no longer a feasible, the loss of that
possible remedy should be included in the aggrieved party’s complete tabulation of damages. Article 28, of
course, forecloses this possibility.
449
U.C.C. § 2-601
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the CISG forecloses the possibility of such an award by requiring the occurrence
of a “fundamental breach” before a contract may be terminated in full.450
Second, the UCC lets a buyer to collect consequential damages for “[i]njury to
person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.”451 CISG,
however, bars any such relief.452

CONCLUSION
With unremitting confidence and mind-numbing repetition, CISG has been
described as the international counterpart to the UCC’s second article.453
Admittedly, because “[m]any provisions of the UCC and the CISG are the same
or similar,”454 “case law interpreting analogous provisions of Article 2” may
“inform a court where the language of the relevant CISG provision tracks that
of the UCC.”455 And, in many situations, though “[t]he common law of contracts
evolved from the . . . [lex mercatoria], the civil law of contracts from canon
law,” “differences in outcome under the two legal regimes are small and
shrinking.”456 This undeniable fact, however, can obscure a crucial verity:
because textual and interpretive divergences do persist, “UCC caselaw ‘is not
per se applicable,’”457 and CISG sometimes dictates an outcome impossible
under the UCC. For these reasons, “it is shortsighted and misleading to say that
the concepts of the CISG correspond to those of the UCC and that the UCC
lawyer can find comfort in the CISG’s similarities to the UCC.”458

450
CISG arts. 25. Notably, however, article 35 requires goods to strictly conform to the contract’s
specifications. As a result, despite implying a stricter standard, a seller remains effectively liable under the CISG
for “any lack of nonconformity.” Regardless, a buyer may always opt for the self-help remedy of unilateral
proportionate purchase price reduction for the seller’s delivery of non-conforming goods.
451
U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b).
452
CISG art. 5.
453
Chicago Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2005); see also
Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp. L.L.C., 635 F.3d 1106, 1107 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Chicago Prime Packers, Inc., 408 F.3d at 898).
454
Chicago Prime Packers, Inc., 408 F.3d at 898; see also VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading
Co., 748 F.3d 780, 786 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Chicago Prime Packers, Inc., 408 F.3d at 898).
455
Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995).
456
Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 635 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing to Joseph M. Perillo,
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 281, 308 n.190 (1994)); cf. Harold J. Berman, The Law of International Commercial
Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 2 EMORY J. INT’L DISP. RESOL. 235, 295 (1988) (“Despite wide differences
among national legal systems, enterprises of all countries have developed a high degree of uniformity in contract
practices for the export and import of goods,” leading to “general similarities of contract practice and contract
law.”).
457
Delchi Carrier SpA, 71 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Orbisphere Corp. v. United States, 726 F. Supp. 1344,
1355 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1989)); see also Ferrari, supra note 197, at 1023–24.
458
Ferrari, supra note 197, at 1033.
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As this Article has demonstrated, in three particular areas—contract
formation, breach definition, and damages’ calculation—CISG, in fact, does so
more often than not. Even as an overwhelming majority of U.S. courts have
proved reluctant to acknowledge these dissimilarities, producing a body of
precedent riven with methodological infirmities upon which others foolishly
rely, this truth cannot be rightly ignored within bankruptcy’s domain. In point
of fact, when an international contract is implicated, upon a court’s proper choice
between CISG and the UCC may depend the security of debtor’s fresh start and
a creditor’s return as well as the legitimacy of a liquidation or the unassailability
of a reorganization. If the Code’s ends are to be achieved in such cases, CISG’s
provisions, then, must be fully heeded, the map sketched throughout this piece
intently followed. By command of Senate, President, and countless others, this
singular law, one which rightly reigns domestically and internationally, thus
commands so that trade may escalate and barriers may fall. Otherwise, good
faith will wither, and ills unwanted will be unleashed, far beyond the reach of
any single court and any single code. Via these means, commerce will, as so
many hoped, flourish among honest merchants,459 the only class of debtors for
which the Code reserves its succor460 and that CISG strives to serve. As history
attests, such a world has been the goal of every mercantile corpus forged since
the first country fair was held,461 the ends deemed just by “the prosaic agencies
of th[is most] commercial world”462 within and beyond the mutable bounds of
modern bankruptcy law.

459
Baird, supra note 26, at 1292 (“Llewellyn’s commercial law . . . sought to work within an existing
landscape,” with the goal of “ensuring that commerce flourishes among honest merchants.”).
460
Marrama v. Citizens Bank, 549 U.S. 365, 374 (2007) (observing that the bankruptcy laws were enacted
to protect honest but unfortunate debtors).
461
See Baird, supra note 26, at 1290.
462
JOSEPH CONRAD, THE SHADOW-LINE, A CONFESSION 35 (Penguin Books 2007) (1917).

